

JPRS 80884

21 May 1982

West Europe Report

No. 1965



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

21 May 1982

WEST EUROPE REPORT

No. 1965

CONTENTS

THEATER FORCES

ITALY

- 'L'UNITA' Comments on NATO, Warsaw Pact Comparison
(Daniele Martini; L'UNITA, 5 May 82) 1

NETHERLANDS

- Editorial Questions No First Use of Atomic Bomb
(NRC HANDELSBLAD, 20 Apr 82) 3

TERRORISM

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

- Report on Activities of Terrorists, DKP, Neo-Nazis
(FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 27 Apr 82) 5

SPAIN

- Antiterrorist Measures Forcing ETA-M To Increase Extortion
(LA VANGUARDIA, 24 Mar 82) 7

- Government Stepping Up Security Measures Against ETA-M
(ABC, 30 Mar 82) 9

POLITICAL

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

- EP's Dankert Interviewed on European 'Autonomy'
(Pieter Dankert Interview; L'UNITA, 30 Mar 82) 11

EC's Tindemans on Portuguese, Spanish Entries (Leo Tindemans; EXPRESSO, 24 Apr 82)	14
BELGIUM	
Communist Party Congress Shows Divisions (Guy Duplat; LE SOIR, 31 Mar 82)	22
DENMARK	
Paper Calls on Government To Resign (Editorial; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 4 May 82)	24
Jorgensen Comments on Nuclear Arms, Government's Viability (Anker Jorgense Interview; B.T., 12 Apr 82)	26
FINLAND	
Paper Views SKP Leadership Maneuvering (HUFVUDSTADSBLADET, 7 May 82)	30
Sorsa Describes Social Democrats' Aims for Country (Kalevi Sorsa Interview; UUSI SUOMI, 31 Mar 82)	32
Soviet Official: CPSU Backs Center Party Policies (HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 8 Apr 82)	36
Briefs	
Christian Party's Westerholm Remaining	38
Foreign Ministry Officials Named	38
FRANCE	
Badinter Outlines Extradition Policy, Asylum Guidelines (LE MONDE, 23 Feb 82)	39
Commentary on Changing Policy	
Badinter on Policy Details	
Diplomatic, Legal Ramifications, by Bertrand Le Gendre	
Jospin on PCI, PSF Ties; Euroleft, Pacifism, Atlantic Alliance (Lionel Jospin Interview; PAESE SERA, 13 Apr 82)	45
PCF Central Committee on Rights, Powers of Workers (L'HUMANITE, 19 Apr 82)	52
NETHERLANDS	
Situation of Parties After Provincial Elections (Dieudonnee ten Berge, et al.; ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE, 27 Mar 82)	61

SPAIN

- UCD Defectors Uncertain About Relations With PSOE
 (Francisco Muro de Iscar; YA, 30 Mar 82) 67

SWEDEN

- Poll; Half of Center, Liberal Voters Changed Party in 1979
 (Hans O. Alfredsson; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 14 Apr 82) 70

- Report Reveals More Reasons Why Moderates Left
 (Ake Ekdahl; DAGENS NYHETER, 21 Apr 82) 73

- 'Exiled' DISK Representative Yucel Top Interviewed
 (Yucel Top Interview; AVANTI, 8 Apr 82) 76

MILITARY

FINLAND

- Command Staff General Describes War Scenario for Finland
 (Pentti Vayrynen Interview; SUOMEN KUVALEHTI, 2 Apr 82) 78

- Finnish Air Force To Buy Three Fokker Transports
 (HUFVUDSTADSBLADET, 7 May 82) 84

NORWAY

- Government Plans To Expand Loran C Navigation System
 (Knut Falchenberg; AFTENPOSTEN, 5 May 82) 85

SWEDEN

- Paper Questions Exoneration of Defense Minister in Sub Case
 (SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 16 Apr 82) 87

GENERAL

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

- German Firm Proposes 2-Stage Reusable Satellite Launcher
 (Horst Rademacher; VDI NACHRICHTEN, 5 May 82) 89

- Problems of Foreign Workers Seen Intensifying
 (NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG, 4/5 Apr 82) 92

- Problems in Federal Border Service Noted
 (Claus-Einar Langen; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 22 Apr 82) 96

NETHERLANDS

- Intelligence Service Harmed By Internal Dissention
 (Johan Olde Kalter; DE TELEGRAAF, 3 Apr 82) 99

'L'UNITA' COMMENTS ON NATO, WARSAW PACT COMPARISON

PM071449 Rome L'UNITA in Italian 5 May 82 p 15

[Report by Daniele Martini: "NATO Insists: Eastern Bloc Stronger Than Us"]

[Text] Rome--Both blocs' arsenals of military propaganda are being reinforced with another weapon. This time it is of NATO manufacture: A 40-page booklet with the very specific title: "NATO and the Warsaw Pact--a Comparison of Strength." It was presented yesterday to the Italian press by socialist Defense Minister Lagorio and at the same time by the other defense ministers in the alliance's other European capitals.

In Brussels, seat of NATO's headquarters, this task was performed by the military organization's secretary general, Joseph Luns. Luns himself wrote the brief preface to the booklet--just a few lines to explain the central topic of the publication: "During the past two decades the numerical balance of forces has changed slowly but steadily in favor of the Warsaw Pact." During the same period the NATO countries have allegedly lost "the technological superiority that enabled the alliance to believe that quality could prevail over quantity."

Such concepts are by no means new and are indeed part of the arsenal that has for months enabled the two superpowers to confront each other in the field of appraisals. The Pentagon, for instance, published a pamphlet entitled "Soviet Military Power" which seeks to define the parameters of the "Russian threat." Moscow replied with a booklet entitled "Whence the Threat to Peace," whose aim is to show that attacks on the balance come from the United States.

Again in this latest NATO publication attention is centered not so much on an overall comparison of the military strength of the two systems as on the European theater.

As in other similar publications, the data and figures contained in this "Comparison of NATO and the Warsaw Pact" are compiled with benefit of inventory [beneficio di inventario]. Moreover the criteria of comparison between the forces are so complex and frequently so inconsistent as to nullify any presumed reliability. For instance, it is enough to cite the dispute over the backfire bomber, a Soviet aircraft which the Americans consider a strategic weapon but which the Soviets do not.

In the NATO booklet too, reading between the lines (amid the usual profusion of numbers, figures and tables) one perceives the difficulty of a reliable comparison, especially if restricted only to Europe: "Even an assessment limited to NATO and Warsaw Pact forces alone would have to take account not only of conventional weapons deployed in Europe on both sides but also of certain forces deployed throughout the world by certain NATO countries and by the Soviet Union, such as, for instance, the substantial forces deployed in Asia and the Pacific by both the United States and the Soviet Union." Furthermore, "there are differences of strategy and military structure, of organization and political cohesion, of naval capacity and role, of nuclear potential and prompt arrival of reinforcements." In other words, a complex system of variables difficult (impossible?) to photograph, especially if protected from propaganda distortions.

The NATO staff who drafted the publication provide definite conclusions based on their evaluations. One of the central conclusions concerns medium and short-range nuclear weapons (commonly called "theater nuclear weapons"); the belief in NATO circles is that "the Warsaw Pact enjoys a substantial numerical advantage," especially in "land-based systems."

According to Lagorio, the balance has been "seriously disrupted" ever since 1977 by the deployment of the Soviet SS-20's. The defense minister said that "this led to the crisis of confidence between East and West" and to the need to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles. Proceeding from these axioms, Lagorio presented his "zero option" once again: The elimination of the medium-range nuclear weapons deployed on land by the Soviets in exchange for the abandonment of the Western missile program launched in 1979.

CSO: 3104/198

EDITORIAL QUESTIONS NO FIRST USE OF ATOMIC BOMB

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 20 Apr 82 p 7

[Text] Doubt

A politically and psychologically extremely dangerous article. That is what the West German Christian Democrat Mertes called the remarks published yesterday in this paper by the prominent Americans McGeorge Bundy, Kennan, McNamara and Smith. In their remarks, which first appeared in the journal FOREIGN AFFAIRS, the four Americans plead for a study of the possibility of having the West renounce the possible use of nuclear weapons as long as it is not attacked with them first, a so-called no-first-use declaration. That would certainly have to be accompanied by a strengthening of West European conventional defense.

It must be held to be a good thing that the authors do not present their thoughts as a completed position or as a miraculous means of squaring the circle, that is to say that a no-first-use declaration. That would certainly have to be accompanied by a strengthening of West European conventional defense.

No superpower can guarantee that in the event of a big conventional war, no nuclear weapons would actually be used. The four recognize that the possibility of use continues to exist as long as these weapons continue to exist. The core of their argument is that the world-encompassing disaster of a nuclear war can only be avoided by placing an impenetrable barrier between all kinds of conflicts and the use of nuclear weapons. And in so doing, they distinguish between an unacceptable nuclear war and an apparently acceptable conventional war, which could be limited to Europe.

With that, the understanding on the part of Europe for the authors' thoughts must be replaced by doubts as to whether that line of thought can produce a contribution to the solution of Europe's problems and Europeans' fears.

The four authors' argument has clear advantages as seen from the United States. The chance of remaining literally out of range there once again would increase in the event of a conventional war limited to Europe.

A scenario of that type does not offer any solace for the Europeans, for a conventional war, too, can lead to the total devastation of the continent, different from the devastation of a nuclear war, but still so all-encompassing that not much would remain of organized civilization here. In Western Europe, many thinkers fear that just this kind of a devastating war can break out if the U.S. nuclear umbrella should stop being watertight.

And at this moment, Europe is not dominated by the belief that Western conventional armament and the devastating power of a confrontation between the East and the West on a conventional level can have such a deterrent effect that the United States' nuclear umbrella could be closed.

Particularly in London and Paris, however, the political majorities seem to be more inclined to the line of the Frenchman Lellouche, who proposed in the same FOREIGN AFFAIRS that a joint British-French atomic power would have to function as a mechanism to bring about a nuclear escalation in the event of a conventional war, if the Americans were no longer willing to do so after a no-first-use declaration.

U.S. pressure to put a no-first-use declaration of the type proposed by McNamara and his group on the NATO agenda would probably be answered by initiatives to establish an independent European nuclear policy, and that would stimulate a new divisive fungus to growth within the alliance.

Even though one cannot deny the authors of the FOREIGN AFFAIRS article their intellectual power and their realism, the danger is not theoretical that the no-first-use question causes difficulties for the Soviet-U.S. negotiations on nuclear weapons control. That is unfortunate, for agreement in those negotiations would be the best guarantee against a nuclear war.

6940
CSO: 3105/168

REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF TERRORISTS, DKP, NEO-NAZIS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 27 Apr 82 p 6

[Article by B. H.: "DKP and Neo-Nazis More Militant. 'New Dimension' Among Revolutionary Cells"]

[Text] There has been hardly any increase in the number of members of terrorist and extremist groups in the FRG over the past year though the danger that they pose has intensified, according to the findings of Baden-Wuerttemberg's Interior Minister Herzog (CDU). Upon the release of the Baden-Wuerttemberg report on the protection of the constitution Monday, the minister stated that the greatest threat to internal security from extremist leftwing terrorism continues to come from the "Red Army Faction" and the "Revolutionary Cells." The willingness and the capacity to employ terrorist action has also grown among rightwing extremists.

The Baden-Wuerttemberg report on anti-constitutional activities shows again and again how extremist groups, both Left and Right, are attempting to infiltrate local and national protest actions or to organize such actions themselves in the hope of gaining credibility among the general public. Thus the German Communist Party (DKP), which with its 40,000 members is still the largest leftwing extremist organization in the FRG, has made the nationally publicized fight "against the NATO double decision" and "for peace and disarmament" into its central focus for agitation. With the "Krefeld Appeal" that was in large part initiated by them, the DKP had hoped, through a nationwide signature petition, to be able to organize a kind of referendum against NATO. In contrast to its cautious, tactically determined moderation of earlier years, the DKP more recently has shown itself willing to give the cover to legitimate action to militancy in all manner of protests and even to use illegal means itself. Ideologically characterized by an uncritical dependency upon Moscow, the DKP has tried more frequently in 1981 than in earlier years to exploit every possibility of propaganda and to create "action fronts" (especially with democratic and moderate groups). In Herzog's words, there are clear indications that the DKP last year received, either directly or indirectly, financial assistance from the GDR in the amount of 50 to 60 million marks.

Pointing to the danger posed by the "Red Army Faction," Herzog noted the attacks upon the U.S. Air Force's European headquarters at Ramstein on 31 August 1981 and upon the commander-in-chief of the U.S. Armed Forces in Europe, General Kroesen, at Heidelberg on 15 September 1981. These two attacks indicated that the "Red Army Faction" once again has the manpower

and the logistics to mount serious attacks. The number of active underground members of the "Red Army Faction" may have increased in the meantime to about 20 persons. Particularly endangered are installations and members of U.S. and NATO Armed Forces. It is very clear that the terrorist organization is attempting to put itself at the vanguard of an increasingly evident anti-U.S. movement among extremist leftwing groups.

The danger posed by the "Revolutionary cells" was made clear by the murder of Hesse's economics minister, Karry, on 11 May 1981. After the initial hesitation of the "Revolutionary Cells" to employ the most serious forms of terrorist action, so as to avoid criticism from the so-called "undogmatic new Left," this first assassination undertaken by the "Revolutionary Cells" indicates that their recently announced "manifold forms of struggle" now also includes the most serious of terrorist assaults as a possible tactical means.

The report names as the most striking commonality of the groups counted among the "undogmatic new Left" the formula, "there's something you lack if you don't fight back." Important characteristics of their initiatives and their activities are "spontaneity" and "autonomy." The generally undogmatic protest movement can count on the support of a broad range of sympathizers heavily infiltrated by extremists, among which can be counted anarchists, "spontis," "urban Indians," militant dropouts" and, to some degree, apolitical punkers.

Within the rightwing extremist movement in the FRG the number of members of militant neo-Nazi groups and circles continued to grow in 1981, it was stated in the report. The rightwing activists have sought to refine their conspirative techniques on the pattern of the extreme leftist terrorists. Parallel to this, the contacts between German neo-Nazis and their counterparts abroad have been intensified. The threat to the security of the FRG has thus taken on a new dimension. The number of active neo-Nazis rose by 50 in 1981 to a present 1,850. At the same time the number of neo-Nazi groups operating in the FRG fell from 22 to 16. The 850 members of these groups are supported by some 400 sympathizers and contributors, who have made substantial amounts of money available to them. Some 600 far-right radicals, according to the findings of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, operate as "lone wolves." The total number of persons who have already engaged in violent acts or who have expressly supported them, is estimated nationally at about 170 neo-Nazis and some 60 other rightwing extremists. Seventy percent of the neo-Nazis are younger than 30, 32 percent of them are skilled workers, about 20 percent students, pupils and apprentices. In contrast to the dominant position held by women in the "Red Army Faction," women number only some 2.6 percent among the neo-Nazis.

9878
CSO: 3103/434

ANTITERRORIST MEASURES FORCING ETA-M TO INCREASE EXTORTION

Madrid LA VANGUARDIA in Spanish 24 Mar 82 p 15

[Text] The attack in Sestao on Monday seems to point to an upswing in terrorist activity by the ETA-M [Basque Fatherland and Liberty-Military]. One of the main developments supporting this assumption is the renewal of the wideranging extortion campaign by the ETA militants to finance replacements for their arrested commandos and to procure weaponry.

Madrid--The police suspect that the attack on Monday in Sestao, in which Superior Police Corps inspectors were machine-gunned down, was carried out by the ETA-M's illegal "Vizcaya" commando group, which is headed by Angel Maria Lete Echaniz, alias "Patas," for whose capture the Interior Ministry offered a reward of 5 million pesetas last September.

The reports that the police have received and the magnitude of the attack point to the "Vizcaya" commando group, which was the same one that kidnapped the industrialist Lipperheide in January, police sources add.

According to the same reliable sources, ETA-M now has five illegal commando units in the Basque Country carrying out terrorist activities.

According to views expressed by circles close to ETA-M, the organization plans an upswing in terrorist activity after the relative calm since last summer. The intensity of such activity is expected to be comparable to what it was in 1980, when it claimed responsibility for some 100 murders. It will allegedly use medium-size weaponry in this campaign, such as bazookas, to make a bigger impact with its attacks, which could increase in number in May and June to coincide with the World Soccer Cup.

Highly reliable sources state that ETA-M has transferred most of its operations from its "sanctuary" in southern France to the interior of the Basque Country. The commando units that were broken up by police are being reconstituted in the wake of a recent membership drive and training program. In addition, the organization's information apparatus, which was hit hard by police, is quickly being repaired.

The bolstering of its armed and information branches entails sizable outlays, which the ETA-M is financing with what it calls "revolutionary taxes." The kidnappings of Basque industrialists Garavilla and Lipperheide have added greatly to such funds. In this connection, a good many Basque businessmen and professionals continue to receive letters demanding large sums of money in exchange for their lives, and it is a known fact that such extortion money has been paid in Spain. The campaigns undertaken by the city governments of Madrid and Vitoria against this blackmail do not seem to have dented the ETA's coffers, and this money is obviously essential to a continuation of its terrorism. Naturally, two of the main aims of the antiterrorist struggle led by the Interior Ministry's commands are to destroy the ETA-M financially and to cut off its weapons shipments.

In another vein, the Basque Nationalist Party seems to be getting involved in the struggle against the ETA and is receiving information from its municipal boards about individuals who are apt to join ETA.

A recent communique from the organization contains a veiled admission of the damage that has been done to its information commands, by asking for grassroots cooperation in connection with "anyone or anything that is preventing or trying to prevent the Basque working people from achieving their social and national liberation."

The observers we consulted agreed that at the high point of its expected terrorist upsurge ETA will once again demand that its negotiating conditions be met. As we know, these conditions are summarized in the KAS [Patriotic Socialist Coordination] alternative. In this connection, several experts on ETA feel that the tactical alternative has been reworded, though it retains the principles of amnesty and "expulsion of police forces," among other things. If after public negotiations Madrid were to accept these conditions, the ETA-M would order a "ceasefire." In the meantime, observers feel, it will continue its armed harassment, because its only bargaining chip is terrorist activity.

The circles that are thoroughly familiar with the history of ETA-M feel that the organization has reduced the number of its attacks this year (seven deaths so far) because it has been reassessing its situation in light of developments in France and Spain, rebuilding its damaged military machine and underscoring that autonomy is a dead end street.

8743

CSO: 3110/109

GOVERNMENT STEPPING UP SECURITY MEASURES AGAINST ETA-M

Madrid ABC in Spanish 30 Mar 82 p 9

[Text] Madrid--The government is going to implement a new series of antiterrorist measures in light of the expected upsurge in such violence. Although the measures are confidential and will be known only to the commands of State Security Forces combating terrorism, EUROPA PRESS has learned that the new government strategy includes a major strengthening of antiterrorist intelligence services, which over the past year have scored notable successes in breaking up ETA commands, as well as attempts to thwart planned ETA actions against individuals and property.

This was the main decision made last Friday by the Standing Committee of the Single Command for Counter-Terrorist Struggle (MULC), which met to assess the most recent action by the ETA-M [Basque Fatherland and Liberty-Military], which points to an upsurge in terrorism.

The Standing Committee consists of the interior minister, Juan Jose Roson, who did not attend the meeting; the director of the MULC, Manuel Ballesteros; the director of State Security, Francisco Laina; the director general of police, Jose Luis Fernandez Dopico; the inspector general of the National Police, Gen Alcala Galiano, and the director general of the Civil Guard, Lt Gen Aramburu Topete.

Confidential. According to what highly reliable sources told EUROPA PRESS, the decision was made at the meeting to continue with current antiterrorist measures and to undertake a new series of measures in light of the expected upsurge in ETA-M violence.

The new measures, which will be going into effect soon, are confidential and will be known only to the top authorities of the State Security Forces that are battling terrorism, the sources said.

The new government strategy for battling ETA includes a major strengthening of antiterrorist intelligence services, which over the past years have scored notable successes in breaking up ETA commands. The same sources have commented that after the most recent ETA attacks, members of State Security Forces, especially those stationed in the

Basque Country, and authorities who could be targets for violence have been told to take extreme security precautions.

The recommendations usually made in these cases include: before leaving home or work, make sure there is nothing suspicious outside; change routines, schedules and itineraries; plan itineraries to go through open places, and have weapons ready for use should the need arise.

Importance of Keeping Alert. The same sources have indicated that the State Security Forces have been called upon specifically not to relax their security precautions, even though the psychological climate might favor doing so because terrorist activity has dropped off, just as before the two most recent attacks that claimed the lives of two Superior Corps inspectors, a young girl and the Guipuzcoa Telephone Company representative.

In this connection, security agents have been reminded of the need to comply with the regulations that have been issued to prevent or at least not facilitate attacks. For example, if several agents go somewhere to eat, they do so separately, never together. While some are eating, the others stand watch at the bar or at a separate table.

The sources have pointed out that "compliance with all of these regulations has generated great tension among members of State Security Forces, but in light of the terrorist phenomenon and the expected upsurge in ETA violence, they must be strictly observed, and our guard must never be let down."

8743
CSO: 3110/109

EP'S DANKERT INTERVIEWED ON EUROPEAN 'AUTONOMY'

Rome L'UNITA in Italian 30 Mar 82 pp 1, 16

[Interview of Pieter Dankert, president of the European Parliament, by Vera Vegetti in Strasbourg; date not specified]

[Text] Strasbourg--The beautiful capital of French Alsace, at a Rhine crossing a few kilometers from the German border, seat of the European Parliament and political capital of Europe, symbolizes by its geographic position the peacemaking ideal which 25 years ago inspired the birth of the European Community. It was here that my conversation took place with the president of the European Parliament, Pieter Dankert, who was recently elected by the solid vote of the leftists to the top post in the Strasbourg Assembly.

[Question] Mr President, the European Community is celebrating its 25th anniversary amid a state of crisis which is the most acute in its history. What remains, after a quarter of a century, of the ideal of a united Europe?

[Answer] "Yes, it is true that we are starting out from a condition of crisis, but without forgetting that in these 25 years the European Community has produced some very important results, with direct historical impact, in the relations among the states of the continent. The French-German problem, that deep wound which divided Europe, has been finally solved, and that was the main political reason for the establishment of the Community. Also, in drawing up the balance sheet of this quarter-century, we must not undervalue the establishment of a large internal market and the common agricultural policy."

[Question] Yes, but today? The French-German reconciliation is by now a legacy of history, while the Common Market and the agricultural policy are gains which the economic crisis has made daily topics of debate. Again, how can we revive a concept of Europe which will reflect the major problems, hopes, and expectations of our days?

[Answer] "I believe that the essential thing is to have a view of the future which can mobilize the Europeans of the second generation, those who have known about the French-German war only through their school books. Obviously this view of the future must be political, and must hinge on the major problems of our era, the relations between East and West and between North and

South. In order to provide a new view of the future to our youth, Europe must define its role in this context, and find an autonomy of its own (naturally limited to the framework of international relations and existing alliances) in the East-West dialogue, in the relationship with the United States, and on the major problems of our time, thereby giving its actions a more specific, less bilateral, and less impotent quality."

[Question] Can there be a role in this big plan for a European Parliament?

[Answer] "Yes, I believe that it is precisely the role of the European Parliament to create this view of the future, to become in the mind of the public the "driving force" of Europe, even if that term is ambitious. When we think of the EEC Council of Ministers, suffocated as it is by national issues and "feuds" among governments, it is obvious that the Parliament is much more representative of the community spirit and the European dimension of problems."

[Question] Let us return to the reality of the crisis, revealed in the resurgence of national egoisms, protectionism, and paralysis of common policies.

[Answer] "Yes, let us discuss the stalled situation of the Community. I believe that in order to explain it we must look not only at the economic crisis situation which has affected all our countries, but also to a moment in the internal history of the EEC, the joining by the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark. The EEC structure did not succeed in adapting to the demands of an enlarged Community. Thus, we now again face the "British problem," which did not emerge just in the past few years, but existed from the time the United Kingdom entered the Community. Now, in the new phase of EEC enlargement, a "Greek problem" is already developing, perhaps less serious, but already an issue on the table of our institutions. However, what makes the crisis more serious is that two contradictory directions are being followed. On the one hand, we are trying to achieve a restructuring and reform of the common policies to better respond to the needs for solidarity and compactness of an enlarged Community in a time of crisis. On the other hand, we are moving in the opposite direction when we approach the issue of the British contribution ("London's request for a reimbursement to settle its deficit with respect to community funds"--editor's note) in a way which is contrary both to the needs for reform and the very spirit of the treaties. We thereby risk solving the 'British problem' at the expense of revival of the common policies."

[Question] You were elected president by vote of the Left. Do you believe that the European Left has a role to play in rescuing us from this 'impasse' and reviving European unity on the major themes of employment and overcoming the crisis?

[Answer] "It must be pointed out that almost all the political elements represented in the European Parliament have, in addition to the ideological differences, also national differences, and this makes it difficult to develop coherent policies. The Left does not have a majority in this Parliament, thus

its first objective can only be to find the broadest consensus of other elements for its initiatives. At any rate, in view of the reality of an elected European parliament, it is up to all political forces to face up to the issues of immediate interest to our people. It is clear, for example, that the way in which the European Parliament undertakes to deal with employment policy will be the fundamental factor in establishing its image over the next few years.

"Everyone is aware today that the unemployment affliction in Europe cannot be resolved without a reduction in working hours, and that can only be done on a European level. Reduction of working hours in only one country is indeed impossible; it is clear that if Germans worked 40 hours and Frenchmen 35, then French industry would be at a disastrous competitive disadvantage. This is why this matter requires an overall European approach, and the social forces must be mobilized to apply the necessary political pressure."

[Question] You do not believe, then, that there is now an opening for a united initiative by the Left?

[Answer] "There is no doubt that the Left has a role to play. The Left is an essential element in all the social structures which must come together to propose the solutions to labor problems. However, it must also be said that the Left does not have an operational program of its own; the trade unions and political parties of the Left have not yet reached agreement on how much needs to be done in restructuring or on social problems, nor on the issue of reduction of working hours. In the Netherlands, for example, they talk about part-time work, while in France the short week is discussed, but there is not a common plan."

[Question] Then would it be desirable and necessary for there to be a plan, a common initiative, by all elements of the European Left, inside and outside the Parliament?

[Answer] "Yes, but there should be an initiative at the level of the European Parliament which can mobilize a majority, otherwise the Left will run the risk of reforming the world only in words, without reforming anything in reality."

[Question] Mr President, in the midst of this wave of pessimism which surrounds the Community's anniversary, do you still have hope for Europe?

[Answer] "Hope? I have patience. I am a historian, and I have some experience with the slow pace, the difficulty, of the ebbs and flows of the historical processes. However, above all I have the profound conviction that European unity is necessary."

9920
CSO: 3104/168

EC'S TINDEMANS ON PORTUGUESE, SPANISH ENTRIES

PM040801 Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 24 Apr 82 pp 1, 19

[Interview with Leo Tindemans, current EC Council of Ministers chairman by Jose Amaral: "We Cannot Now Refuse Portugal's and Spain's Membership"-- undated; in Brussels]

[Text] EXPRESSO: Belgium's term of chairmanship has coincided with the "pause" in the expansion process introduced by Giscard d'Estaing. To what extent can a direct relationship be established between the government change in Paris and the acceleration of membership negotiations at the beginning of this year?

Leo Tindemans: I am not acquainted with the French Government's intentions, but I note the following fact: France cooperated actively and positively in the negotiations that led to the 22 February agreement on the first package of negotiations. At no time did I observe any obstructive attitude on France's part, and the continuation of this atmosphere should enable us by the end of the month to reach agreement on a number of the most important problems, thus really opening the way to membership.

EXPRESSO: Was the "obstructive" attitude that you mentioned apparent before?

Leo Tindemans: At one time in some speeches there was a tone that reflected a kind of hesitancy, which could be expressed in the following question: Is the community ready to adapt to the entry of new members? Now this question is not being asked, except (as I do) with regard to defining a method that will enable us to reach important decisions efficiently within the common market. As I always say, if we continue to apply the rule of unanimity, we will never reach any important decisions. This is why I advocate a return to orthodox negotiations. Let us have the courage to decide by an adequate majority on the "major issues."

Special Session to Overcome Deadlock

EXPRESSO: I would like to return to this point a little later. Before that, however, I would like you to outline the general prospects for the "legacy" that the Belgian chairmanship might leave its successors with regard to Portugal's membership at the end of the 6-month term. On the basis of

information currently available, do you believe that the 26 April and 20 June ministerial meetings will enable substantial agreement to be reached on the problems comprising the second package?

Leo Tindemans: I believe so. Anyway, I hope so. The possibility of perhaps convening a special council of ministers session before the end of the Belgian term of chairmanship has also been considered.

EXPRESSO: Would this special meeting, following the other ministerial meetings, be designed solely to resolve problems that have emerged in Portugal's negotiations?

Leo Tindemans: Precisely. But note that I said there is a possibility of a meeting.

EXPRESSO: Was this ministerial meeting envisaged solely in connection with negotiations with Portugal? If so, why?

Leo Tindemans: At present the problem does not arise for Spain. The possibility was raised when we examined the remaining problems between Portugal and the community, within the context of the second package. It was decided that if necessary it would be possible to envisage a special council of ministers meeting before the end of the 6-month term, to try to resolve any issues not yet resolved. But the convening of such a session was discussed only as a possibility. We shall see.

EXPRESSO: At the present stage of negotiations would it be appropriate to suggest the possibility of nonsimultaneous admission for the two Iberian countries, particularly as a result of a possible delay in Spain's membership process?

Leo Tindemans: This question should not be put to the EC council of ministers chairman. We have examined the problems as they have been submitted to us. When we have reached conclusions we have conveyed them to the body able to take final decisions, namely the council of ministers. Therefore the question of what is happening with regard to this or that candidate for membership does not officially arise, at least as far as the chairman is concerned.

EXPRESSO: But you must surely have an exact idea of the rate at which the two applications are being processed, partly because it raises a not unimportant political issue...

Leo Tindemans: In Belgian politics I have gained some experience of the result of the link that people sometimes try to create between important decisions. Normally there is a failure with regard to both. Let us process matters at their natural rate; then we shall see. When a fruit is ripe, it must be picked...

Political Cooperation: Luncheon or Dinner

EXPRESSO: At the start of Belgium's term of chairmanship the "ten" defined a mechanism for the involvement of the Portuguese and Spanish Governments in EC political cooperation by means of biannual ministerial meetings and regular contacts between Foreign Ministry political officials. Has a date been fixed yet for the first attendance by Portuguese and Spanish ministers at an EC session devoted to political cooperation?

Leo Tindemans: Meetings among political officials have been processed normally. As for ministers, their involvement has been promised, but as far as I know no date has been set for the first meeting.

EXPRESSO: How will this participation be processed? Will it be a "separate" meeting, or are the ministers directly invited to take part in a meeting of the "ten"?

Leo Tindemans: There will be an exchange of viewpoints, following a ministerial meeting devoted to political cooperation. These contacts could take place at a luncheon or dinner, for instance. We would hold the meeting, sit down at table and invite our Portuguese and Spanish colleagues to join us and hold free discussions with them on such an occasion.

Africa Still a Portuguese Triumph

EXPRESSO: With regard to political cooperation, the evolution of Portugal's relations with its former African colonies will probably be one of the topics discussed during the president of the republic's imminent official visit and has been the subject of growing interest in community circles. The meetings between the secretary of state for foreign affairs and commissioner Edgar Pisani are a clear demonstration of this interest and again emphasize the role that Portugal could play in European-African relations. In your opinion, is this aspiration in Portuguese foreign policy sufficiently well founded to become a specific reality, or is it just an optimistic speculation, bearing in mind the institutional ties with Africa already forged by the EC?

Leo Tindemans: Africa is still a triumph for Portugal. It is noteworthy that the president of the former colonizing country can pay an official visit to Angola without any incidents or difficulties occurring. This proves that the Portuguese are still accepted and are not regarded as imperialists. I can only encourage everything that has to do with building the best possible contacts with Africa or certain African countries. Portugal could well become a turntable between Europe and Africa, despite the existence of the Lome convention and all the organized machinery that links the community to that continent. To maintain good relations in Africa and to develop this mediating role is something that I can only applaud.

EXPRESSO: Do you believe in the hypothesis of a future institutionalized three-way cooperation among Portugal, the community and the Portuguese-speaking African countries?

Leo Tindemans: It is not impossible. It is true that direct ties already exist between the community and Africa. But even now--and you will doubtless understand what I am about to say--Portugal can play a very useful role, bearing in mind the situation in certain African countries.

EXPRESSO: Some member states, such as France or even Belgium, however, already have important relations with some of the former Portuguese colonies and have far greater means of cooperation than could be brought into play by Lisbon. Is the cultural factor sufficient to give Portugal's position the advantage?

Leo Tindemans: There is the language, the culture and a mutual acquaintance with the peoples' mentality: These are inestimable factors, which cannot be invented and which no other country can create from scratch.

Expansion and Mediterranean: Difficult Balance

EXPRESSO: The consequences of the expansion for the balance of community Mediterranean policy has assumed growing importance within the ensemble of "major problems" that the "ten" believe must be resolved before Portugal and Spain join. The scale of Spanish agriculture raises this issue both within the context of the organization of the community's internal market and within the context of the EEC's special relations with the countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean. To what extent could this lead to a dilemma capable of jeopardizing the expansion?

Leo Tindemans: When a democratic country applies for EC membership and accepts the conditions, that is, the "community ethos" ["acquis communautaire"], we have no right to refuse. This has always been my opinion and I still hold it, but obviously it is necessary to envisage a transitional period so that candidate countries can adapt to common market economic conditions. The expansion poses a problem with regard to development policy in general and raises specific difficulties with regard to Mediterranean agriculture in particular.

The solutions must be found by adapting the present common agricultural policy, by allocating finance to support southern countries. It must be stressed, however, that EC membership implies the desire to be a member. If we tried to join the community just to derive immediate benefits and withheld any solidarity, then membership could only be prejudicial to the whole.

EXPRESSO: But is the community in a position to find a balanced solution to this problem, since there is no solution to the "Mediterranean question" within the framework of present common agricultural policy without mobilizing large financial means?

Leo Tindemans: I do not deny that the problem exists. Moreover, I would say that it already exists within the present community, in connection with France, Italy and Greece. It all depends on whether the new memberships will exacerbate the situation or actually impart the stimulus we need to reach a solution.

EXPRESSO: Nevertheless, the solution to the balance of the community's internal market will have to take into account relations with the "preferential countries" on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, without jeopardizing the "ten's" positions with regard to an area that they consider of strategic importance to the consistency of their foreign policy...

Leo Tindemans: In this connection the new memberships might perhaps create some problems within the context of political cooperation, with implications affecting relations with the entire Mediterranean and inevitably with the Middle East. The Mediterranean is not limited to the countries of southern Europe, and in fact the definition of our policy with respect to that area is at stake. I therefore believe that good use must be made of the transitional periods to carry out whatever modifications prove necessary.

The 1984 Deadline: "We Never Fixed a Rigid Date"

EXPRESSO: The EC recently instructed four specialized bodies to make an economic study of the overall impact of the expansion on the community's Mediterranean relations. November was the deadline set for the submission of this study, which is intended to be used as one of the bases for defining the stances to be adopted by the "ten" with respect to agriculture in negotiations with Portugal and Spain. Could the need to analyze these matters in greater depth seriously delay the speed of the expansion? Do you believe that the definition of the basic principles of future EC Mediterranean policy is a precondition for concluding negotiations with the Iberian countries?

Leo Tindemans: In theory, I would say "yes." If we want to know exactly what repercussions a particular political step will have on other countries and we lack the necessary information, we could cause blocking or obstructive factors.

EXPRESSO: Could one conclude in this connection that membership is not technically possible in 1984?

EXPRESSO: But this implies the completion of negotiations early in 1983, assuming that the Parliaments are willing to ratify the treaty in under a year...

Leo Tindemans: We are responsible for the negotiations until the end of June. I do not know what will happen after that, but the Belgian chairmanship believes that membership in 1984-5 is still possible.

EXPRESSO: But 1985 is not the same...

Leo Tindemans: I know, let us say 1984. It is not impossible.

We All Seek An Answer

EXPRESSO: If Portugal and Spain were to apply for membership now, do you believe that the "ten's" answer would be affirmative?

Leo Tindemans: Your question is based on a hypothesis. It is not very good for a politician to answer a hypothesis...

EXPRESSO: Such answers do facilitate the creation of an "atmosphere," however...

Leo Tindemans: I have the impression that the community is not very sure where it wants to go.

EXPRESSO: What does this mean as far as Portugal and Spain are concerned?

Leo Tindemans: I am talking in general terms. What are its aims, which and how many countries do we intend to embrace and under what conditions; to what extent do we aim to extend integration? We must answer these questions. It seems to me that we are all seeking an answer, but we are not sure where to find it.

EXPRESSO: Is this third expansion taking place under these conditions, somewhat haphazardly?

Leo Tindemans: The question of Portugal's and Spain's membership has been raised in definitive terms: We cannot refuse it. We must therefore reach a good agreement: That is my philosophy.

EXPRESSO: Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou said recently that he is in favor of the idea of a "two-speed Europe," with degrees of integration consistent with levels of economic development. Could this issue arise again, in view of the problems stemming from the expansion?

Leo Tindemans: Since Greece has become a community member the problem no longer arises in this specific case, unless Athens concludes that it cannot continue as a full member in accordance with the idea that governed the creation of the present community, based on the integration of economies with a comparable level of development. At that time association agreements were regarded as a means for preparing the future membership of other countries. Later the whole range of association agreements were invented: some are indeed intended to prepare for membership, while others establish ad hoc statutes for countries that will never be members and others again stipulate preferential forms of treatment called "association."

We are straying somewhat from our original principles. However, from the moment of membership, this membership must be accepted--not just in order to derive advantages, but also to fulfill duties and obligations. In the long term it is not feasible to be a member and to adopt a negative or abstention stance on every occasion.

It was not I who invented the expression "two-speed Europe." It was attributed originally to Willy Brandt. It is said that my report on European unity published in 1976 advocated a two-speed Europe in the economic and monetary sphere. The people who say that have misread my report, because

I merely suggested a method of evolution for the so-called currency snake which, as is known, did not include all the member states.

In general, almost abstract terms, I would say finally that, if some countries want to advance toward economic and monetary union and others do not, if some want to act as a community in all fields where this is possible and others reject such a stance, sooner or later we must know who wants to go forward and who does not.

Return to Qualified Majority Essential

EXPRESSO: Would this mean the disintegration of the community as we now know it?

Leo Tindemans: In the future, obviously. How can we remain within the same group, if some states can obstruct the entire decision making process on their own?

EXPRESSO: Is the return to the qualified majority therefore the touchstone of imparting a new thrust to the community?

Leo Tindemans: It is one of the major issues. The most important of all, however, is the will to forge the community. We cannot accept the mentality of those who agree when it is a matter of reaping the benefits, but who say "do not count on us" with regard to everything else.

EXPRESSO: Do you believe there will be a return to the qualified majority, in view of the opposition being prompted by such a possibility, particularly among states that can obstruct decisions?

Leo Tindemans: It is not only possible. It is necessary, indispensable. Unless we succeed in taking decisions, the community is doomed to disappear. It might become a kind of free trade zone, but it will never be an economic community or a "European union."

EXPRESSO: Can I infer from all you have said an attitude not very consistent with the "indispensable" status recently demanded by the Greek Government in a memorandum submitted to the Council of Ministers?

Leo Tindemans: No. I did not say that. I was speaking in general terms, from an academic viewpoint. Greece is seeking its path. We have always agreed that when a country encounters serious difficulties we can temporarily take special measures. It is legitimate to submit a memorandum. The Greek document will be examined and then we shall see.

"Internal Reform": Nothing Definite

EXPRESSO: Could you describe the situation with regard to the community's internal reform, on the basis of the so-called 30 May mandate, particularly with regard to the British issue and the restructuring of the common agricultural policy?

Leo Tindemans: Nothing is definite. Until there is total agreement on all the topics included in the mandate, nothing will be definite. Subject to this total agreement, we have reached an understanding on some points, including controls on agricultural spending (there are still some Irish reservations on this) and Mediterranean problems. In this latter regard a document has been virtually agreed on.

There should have been a council meeting on 3 April, but the Falklands crisis blew up. Together with Gaston Thorn, I had prepared for this meeting a reconciliation proposal, initially very well received but subsequently jeopardized by certain statements which did not please us very much. The council will meet at last on Monday and Tuesday in Luxembourg, when the British issue will be on the agenda.

EXPRESSO: Are you optimistic about the possibility of a rapid solution?

Leo Tindemans: I am neither optimistic nor pessimistic. I am realistic: It will not be easy, but I hope that we will find a solution.

CSO: 3101/37

COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS SHOWS DIVISIONS

Brussels LE SOIR in French 31 Mar 82 p 2

[Article by Guy Duplat: "Stalinists and Eurocommunists Returned to the PCB Back to Back"]

[Text] The 24th congress of the Communist Party of Belgium [PCB] was one of the most difficult and most stormy ones since the war. Since its last congress in 1979, the PCB had been divided in two. There was, on the one hand, a "Eurocommunist" wing consisting of the Flemish, the inhabitants of Brussels, the young and the intellectuals who favor new fields of struggle, a progressive movement toward socialism and separation from the Soviet bloc. And on the other hand, there was a "Stalinist" wing, with as spearhead the inhabitants of Liege. The latter, obsessed with economic problems alone, believe that the PCB should be a workers' party, that it should remain unconditionally allied to the Soviet Union and that the movement toward socialism can occur only through revolution.

Of course, each movement had its own contradictory analysis of the serious defeat suffered by the party in the elections of 8 November. It could be said that the congress returned back to back the most extremist elements of both wings, that it struck to the left and to the right. Mr Juchmes from Liege for example, the "Stalinist minstrel" was not reelected to the central committee; the same is true for Dubosc from Brussels, a Eurocommunist who did not hesitate to put on an equal footing "Soviet imperialism and American imperialism."

Thus, the congress avoided making a choice and preferred to stress the "reasonably" Eurocommunist options which have been the PCB's for 3 years already. This choice, which some people refer to as that of the "soft belly" of Wallonia, was also that of the rising technocrats, Representative Jacques Nagels and Pierre Beauvois.

This compromise was not accepted unanimously. Whereas at the last congress, all motions were passed with touching unanimity, this time the majority of the issues were passed by only two-thirds of the votes. On the Belgian domestic level, the revolutionary road was rejected. The Communist Party believes "that one must start with possible and necessary changes within the framework of the existing institutions and that it is only in a second stage that a transition toward 'pure' socialism will be possible."

Those "in the minority," on the other hand, believed that this was "a reformist illusion" and that one should on the contrary promote a sudden break. This Liege movement fits into the old tradition of revolutionary unionism. These same minority elements believed that only the workers could challenge today's society. This worker approach was rejected by the congress, which considered that the new forces (young people, intellectuals, ecologists) could also be the moving force behind change.

The concept of Eurocommunism was somewhat specified. It does involve "a specifically Belgian road to socialism." At the international level, the choice was a delicate one. A large majority rejected the idea of putting the two big blocs on an equal footing. As Louis Van Geyt, who was reelected president with a relatively narrow majority of the votes, commented: "The Eastern bloc is absolutely essential to us as a counterweight to American imperialism, which remains the most dangerous. We are in favor of the elimination of both of these blocs, but we are resolutely opposed to the logic of the dismantling of these blocs being carried out in an unbalanced way."

Moreover, many participants at the congress complained about the manner in which LE DRAPEAU ROUGE, the party newspaper, covers international news. They accused the paper of putting too much emphasis on criticism from the USSR in the Polish affair, for example, and not enough on the "nevertheless very important" role of the Eastern countries.

In addition to its ideological cleavage, the PCB is divided by a community division. It is true that the last unitary party, together with the UDRT [Democratic Union for Respect for Work (Walloon)], has tried in recent years to proceed with the internal communarization of its structures, but sensitivities are manifestly too different in the country's two communities. Another congress, the "second 24th," has been planned for the end of the year with a review of the party structures on its agenda. The structures would be federalized more and, on the other hand, guarantees would be provided to ensure a better representation of young people and women in the management bodies.

8463
CSO: 3100/531

PAPER CALLS ON GOVERNMENT TO RESIGN

PM101347 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 4 May 82 p 8

[Editorial: "Toward Surrender"]

[Text] The prime minister does not want to have the sleeves pulled off his jacket. But this is nevertheless what is happening. And what is most probable is that that day when Anker Jorgensen sits down to work in his shirt sleeves he will no longer be working. Neither the Radical Liberals nor the Socialist People's Party [SF] seem to be prepared to allow the Social Democrats to keep their jackets on. They are both continuing to each pull at a sleeve and they are pulling harder and harder. It is as if they simply cannot be bothered to listen to what the government is saying.

On the one side stands the Radical Liberal Party, which has proclaimed that it is demanding a tough incomes policy over the next few years as a condition of its collaboration on economic policy. On the other the People's Socialists have drawn up a program which makes absolutely no concessions to the government. In the middle there is the government with a program of action which it considers to be the only foundation on which to base an agreement. The tone of all three has been sharpened recently. It was the Radical Liberals and the SF who wanted the social democratic government to continue in office and it was they who persuaded a seemingly reluctant Anker Jorgensen to stay on as prime minister. But it is as if the two support parties have become less and less concerned with ensuring the government's continued existence and are letting themselves be led more and more by the desire to give profile to their own policies. Every time the prime minister reaches out to one or other of them, first the one and then the other falls back so that the distance between grows greater and greater.

In this situation it can hardly surprise anyone that those with reservations in the social democratic Folketing group are giving public expression to their worries that this situation will persist with the result that nothing will happen--or at least only that the Social Democratic Party will be exhausted and broken down by wielding government responsibility which it cannot do anything with. Both former Folketing group chairman Jens Risgaard Knudsen and group secretary Jytte Andersen have clearly stated that this situation is untenable. They see the outcome as being either that the government will have to resign or that it will have to call a Folketing election.

The thinking behind both these possibilities would have to be to allow the Social Democrats to go into opposition. There are undoubtedly increasing numbers of Social Democrats who regret that the government continued in office after the December election. They take the view that the party would have been best served by allowing others to govern, while it tried to gather its strength.

Party tactical considerations still seem to be playing an increasingly dominant role both for the government and for its so-called support parties. But because this is the case it will be impossible to maintain the expectation that the three parties can agree on something which will be even vaguely adequate. In such circumstances it would benefit society if the government gave up. And the sooner the better.

CSO: 3106/107

JORGENSEN COMMENTS ON NUCLEAR ARMS, GOVERNMENT'S VIABILITY

Copenhagen B.T. in Danish 12 Apr 82 p 4

[Interview with Anker Jorgensen, prime minister by Flemming Hansen and Henrik Winther: "Anker: I am a Native Optimist, and That Scares Me"]

[Text] "I guess some measure of naive optimism is part of me. Even if things in fact look hopeless, something in me tells me that things are not that hopeless after all. Which may be somewhat naive - and it scares me sometimes."

1982 is a year of celebration for Anker Jorgensen.

On 5 October it will be ten years since he took office as Prime Minister for the first time, and on 13 July the former worker celebrates his 60th birthday.

What has the ten years at the summit of power done to him?

"I have become ten years older and have of course reaped considerable experience. But I feel at bottom that nothing fundamental has changed in me--which someone will regret, I suppose. I don't think I have changed my conduct, nor my way of expressing myself."

"But contrary to what was the case ten years ago you are now governing society. Hasn't that changed your outlook on things?"

"Not in any decisive manner, but it goes without saying that you do not carry primary responsibility for social developments for a period of ten years without feeling burdened by that responsibility."

"Do you like being Prime Minister?"

"YES!--And let me add that it is not always pleasant but in fact more often than not very problematic. However, it is nonetheless an interesting job, for if one likes to be at the center of responsibility and decision-making, it is both exciting and toilsome. One must have endurance."

"Is there anything special which keeps you still going strong?"

"In solemn terms, it is the belief that our effort is useful. Even when things are at their worst, I hope and believe that our effort is useful for the population and the groups in society to which we must give special consideration. I believe it is useful that I do what I do. Not only I but everything my movement stands for. I willingly admit that there are many problems. The unemployment could make you very depressed."

"And the result is that youths are fighting in the streets and throw toilets at the police?"

"I am just as sorry about this as I am certain that they are only few in numbers. Perhaps only 100 youths do this, and this should not give one the impression that that is how young people behave. But many young people have just cause for being nervous about the future and may therefore be tempted to react more forcefully than they would have done under normal conditions. But only a few days ago I went to a youth club with 100-150 young people. And the discussion with them showed me that young people also hold other and more down-to-earth opinions. But we who carry responsibility do have an obligation to be open to young people so that we may understand the causes of conflicts."

"When you became Prime Minister ten years ago, did you imagine that all these problems would emerge?"

"No, I didn't. I had hoped that the good development could have been sustained for many years. But it couldn't--the crisis came."

"Do you feel that your illusions and visions from then are shattered?"

"No, visions are all right, but the devilish economic facts cannot be explained away. Our main task is to moderate the effects of the crisis on the underdog. That is where the vision and mission lies."

"How long do you plan to continue as Prime Minister?"

"I do not wish to mention any age limit or to say when I plan on retiring because one should not say so until it is approaching. And the retiring date is not approaching at the moment."

"What do you plan to do as a retiree?"

"It is obvious that one asks oneself that question once in a while. But I think that my imagination is so vivid that time will pass. By the way, no time should not just pass. Life is too precious for time just "to pass." But I hope to be able to use time in a useful, interesting and pleasant way."

"Have you any definite plans?"

"Oh no."

"You do not dream of sailing around the world or something like that?"

"Well, what I really would like to do was to go around Europe and have a little less official look at Europe than the one I have had for the past ten years--by car and preferably in a reasonably equipped van, I would really like to do that. And have plenty of time--not just two or three weeks. A full summer to go out to all corners of Europe where you normally wouldn't go."

"Some time in the future you will pass into history as a sort of epoch. How do you think historians will characterize your performance?"

"I would not try to characterize the period during which I have been Prime Minister--I think I will leave that to the historians and the editorial writers. But I think I know what they will write. They will write that that was the period in which full employment was transformed into unemployment of such and such a size. This is what they will write--and they will be right. But this is the same trend we see in all countries, which may have had three, five or even ten Prime Ministers. But what I hope they will appreciate--perhaps--is that, not I, but the Social Democratic Party and the trade union movement did their best. Both in terms of creating jobs and countering the negative impact of the crisis to prevent our social welfare from being undermined. In economic crises, reactionary and conservative movements always emerge. And it is so easy for those in employment to believe that the cause of the high unemployment rate is our too generous social welfare. This is when something like that becomes popular. Our mission is to reject and fight those views. And I believe that we--and I--have done so. We have even extended social security, just consider the early retirement scheme. I believe it to be justified for us and me to have defended our welfare in a crisis where there was a risk it would be undermined altogether. But bear in mind, I have not stepped down yet. I will continue to fight the crisis and to carry out significant reforms in the future."

"But the effort has a price, doesn't it. The West German Social Democratic Party has recently strongly declined in voter support in local elections, and the reason for this is said to be that the large party is both in favor of and against almost all central issues. In favor of and against NATO, defense the EC and nuclear power. Isn't the same true of the Danish Social Democratic Party?"

"No, it isn't. We favor a defense but not the arms race. We are against nuclear weapons. We are against nuclear power as long as safety is not as total as it should be. One could say that in this decade we have been out in front to sense what happened in the population to be able to express it ourselves. We are therefore to a high extent also a grassroots movement."

"But Gert Petersen of the Socialist People's Party races forward because he is able to sell the 'genuine' thing. Are you nervous about his progress?"

"It is a plus to have ideas but they should be linked to economic and political facts. It could be dangerous if some of the views Gert Petersen represents result in the same situation to the left of the center as to the right. The right wing is divided into a number of factions, and even though they claim to be in full agreement, their weakness is that they are highly divided. There are rivalries and disagreements--they are not capable of government. The same thing could happen to the left of the center. I do see that danger. It must not happen though. Parties to the left of the Social Democratic Party have been able to weaken us at intervals. But we have regained our strength on each occasion."

"Could the solution be a Social Democratic/Conservative/Liberal coalition government. K.B. Andersen, among others, has said: what other alternative is there?"

"No, I definitely don't think so. I think it is fine for Poul Schluter to express far more willingness to openness and cooperation. If a thought like this were to come true--and I am not considering that at the moment--the party or parties in question must provide more concrete indications of their willingness in the negotiations in Parliament. They should be more positive towards us."

"How long can the government remain in power?"

"I believe that the Radical Liberals and the Socialist People's Party but also other parties--will collectively or individually support the government. For our views are reasonably broadly backed in the population. Let me mention the pension fund issue on which we were finally toppled. It was accused of being socialism through the back door. Now a large majority say: of course the pension funds should be permitted to invest. But then they could not resist the temptation of toppling the government. And let me mention the indexed wage system--it didn't work, they said--now it is broadly backed. Things are better than predicted in December. The truth wins but too slowly."

"Do you expect to cooperate better with the LO President, Knud Christensen?"

"I expect to cooperate just as well with him. Why do I say that? With less noise, perhaps, but the same positive cooperation as with Thomas. It is not very important that the relations between Thomas and me have been noisy. He has always had the courage to take responsibility on behalf of his members, not a very popular thing but necessary. Even when we were on the most unfriendly terms--which lasted only a short while--I have said that it was a fantastic display of courage for an LO President to take such a responsibility. I think the new President will too. But I think our relations will be more quiet. And I regret if that makes it less entertaining for you that way."

CSO: 3106/108

PAPER VIEWS SKP LEADERSHIP MANEUVERING

PM101357 Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 7 May 82 p 6

[Unattributed report: "Taistoist Supports Sinisalo"]

[Text] "Who's afraid of Taisto Sinisalo?" Taistoist member of the SKP political committee Seppo Toivainen asks rhetorically in a statement he published yesterday.

The statement indicates how strongly the minority is behind the reelection of Sinisalo as party deputy chairman.

Among the so-called "rebels" from the previous party congress, the so-called Kemppainen Phalanx, it is an absolute demand that Sinisalo should also retire when Saarinen resigns as party chairman.

These two together have been seen as symbols of the party split. In addition Sinisalo has been accused of unwillingness to cooperate.

The party's so-called third line has a softer approach. It is talking of a compromise which would mean Sinisalo's being elected an ordinary member of the political committee. In such a situation Seppo Toivainen would be deputy chairman and have Sinisalo to support him in the political committee. Toivainen is not a leader type able to make independent decisions. He needs support, voices from the third line are saying.

But now Toivainen is pushing Sinisalo strongly as a member of the party leadership. He does not give any more detailed definition of what he means, but in the past he has said that he is referring to the deputy chairmanship. In other words there is going to be a tough fight about Sinisalo personally at the 14-15 May extraordinary party congress.

Sinisalo himself has let it be clearly known that he has absolutely no intention of withdrawing at the same time as Aarne Saarinen. In his statement, which is almost a panegyric to Sinisalo, Toivainen denies assertions that Sinisalo lacks ability to cooperate and that he is a symbol of the party split. He describes Sinisalo as a "creative Leninist" and says that only the bourgeois forces would benefit from his being purged from the party leadership.

The party's central committee is meeting today and tomorrow and will discuss the difficult questions of the party newspaper and of participation in government.

On Sunday [9 May] a delegation will leave for Moscow to discuss the situation on the eve of the extraordinary party congress with the Soviet sister party.

The extraordinary congress will be held next Friday and Saturday in Kulturhuset. The same delegates as at last summer's ordinary congress will meet to try to patch up the party or, alternatively, reach a definite break.

However, the situation is said to be clearer now than before the ordinary congress. General Secretary Arvo Aalto and Labor Minister Jouko Kajanoja are contenders for the chairmanship. The one who loses will become general secretary. Arvo Aalto seems to have greater support.

The Kemppainen Phalanx's special favorite seems to be construction workers union chairman Aarno Aitamurto, who has been nominated for the post of general secretary.

CSO: 3109/156

SORSA DESCRIBES SOCIAL DEMOCRATS' AIMS FOR COUNTRY

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 31 Mar 82 p 3

[Interview with Social Democratic Party Chairman Kalevi Sorsa, date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] Explain what democratic socialism means -- in such a way that the man on the street can understand it?

[Answer] Well, translated into Finnish democracy is kansanvalta [rule of the people] and socialism is yhteisollisyys [collectivism]. Socialist theories and utopias began to appear in the last century as a counterreaction to liberalism, which, on the other hand, emphasized the importance of the individual. If liberalism believes that the free competition of individuals against each other best develops the economy and society, socialism believes that cooperation among individuals is the best solution. Thus there is a considerable amount to be believed in each of them along with knowledge.

[Question] What in the final count does the SDP intend to socialize?

[Answer] Not even the Communists talk about the socialization of an old people any more, the so-called compulsory expropriation of property. Today it is possible to talk about future socialization in the sense that society will participate in the development and management of new enterprise initiatives; in the sense that decisionmaking power in economic circles is given to society and in the sense that the basis of ownership will be expanded by means of employee funds, for example.

[Question] If socialism is not socialization, then what is it?

[Answer] I do not want to get ahead of the SDP's new program of principles, but an answer to this question would reveal its most essential points.

[Question] Do you believe that after the events in Poland anyone will talk on behalf of any kind of socialism? The word has acquired a burden.

[Answer] The word has become strained, but the idea has not. Social Democrats do not have any responsibility for the development of Poland or any other similar country. According to my understanding the need for the underprivileged to join together in society to defend their interests remains regardless

of the level of development and therefore the appeal of socialism -- particularly democratic socialism -- will not disappear.

[Question] If the movement is important and not the goal, then what is the movement like?

[Answer] The movement is important and so is the direction of this movement -- and not the goal, which frequently turns out to be an illusion. Societies never stop developing, they change, they move. Whoever takes it upon himself to direct this development must be involved in the movement, internally and in relationship to society. A reformer must also reform. Our direction, on the other hand, is increased security for the individual and increased equality in society.

[Question] Will economic power be transferred into the hands of trade union bureaucrats by means of the employee funds?

[Answer] In Finland the employee fund movement has not been developed with such close organizational ties as in Sweden. Certainly, trade union activists -- and not so much bureaucrats -- will have an opportunity to express their opinions within the Finnish system.

[Question] In Finland the state also owns enterprises. Are Valmet and Enso examples of the concept that enterprises should be placed under state control?

[Answer] Not now. But at another time the answer could have been to the contrary. These enterprises have been in existence for a long time and good as well as bad years have been encountered.

[Question] Will investment capital increase and will lending policy decisions change if state representatives are appointed to the boards of directors of banks and insurance companies?

[Answer] I do not believe that investment capital will increase. This could have some significance for lending policies.

[Question] Do the Social Democrats in the final count intend to do something about changing capitalism as a system?

[Answer] Do we finally intend to quit beating our wife? The question is as ambiguous as a seesaw. Capitalism changes every day, our system changes every day, we change -- along with others -- but when one is changing along with it, it is as difficult to observe this change as it was for the Church in its day to admit the correctness of Galileo's arguments. But it continues to turn anyway.

[Question] Are you a social democrat or a socialist?

[Answer] A social democrat.

[Question] Can a peasant trust in the fact that the hand of socialism will not grab his fields, forests, and gravel pits?

[Answer] He can. Besides, I will protect them.

[Question] Is it worth-while for anyone to invest in shares since the tax man takes the income and the socialist threatens one's whole portfolio?

[Answer] Investment in shares means participation in the risks of an enterprise, in this it differs from bank savings and securities. The additional allegations appended to this question are incorrect. Wise investments in shares are worth-while.

[Question] If we proceed from the mixed economy concept that there are as many markets as possible and as many plans as are necessary, then where is the boundary?

[Answer] The question is too difficult for me. Can we try a lower level?

[Question] Do you intend to create the same kind of system as in the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries?

[Answer] Indeed, the Communists are certainly better in their own area of competency. Let us remain in our's.

[Question] Is it worth-while for an entrepreneur to attempt anything since there are always new payments, stipulations, and directives? Everything is being socialized.

[Answer] From the point of view of the entrepreneur development in recent years has been turned in an opposite direction. Burdens and obstacles have been reduced. He who wants to play the role of an alarmist keeps alive the fear of socialism.

[Question] Will firms be better managed at least from the point of view of the wageearner if decisions are made by politicians instead of the owners and directors?

[Answer] An enterprise is a community which succeeds in the tasks it has assumed if it is able to harmonize the aspirations of its participants within the framework of its operations. In addition to the owners and directors of trade unions, the latter mentioned participants are an enterprise's employees, funders, clients, and society (state and local governments). Ideal solutions have undoubtedly not yet been found, and, certainly, a solution will not be found by giving the decisionmaking power to the "politicians" alone (that is, by just protecting the interests of public power). But all parties are needed in a cooperation that is as flawless as possible so that an enterprise and those depending on it will succeed.

[Question] Is it socialization when a state joins an enterprise threatened with bankruptcy?

[Answer] Frequently, it is only a misunderstood social policy. It is never socialization. But if an enterprise's operations are healthy and difficulties can be overcome by the state's contribution, then inclusion in its operations is justified by whatever name it is called.

[Question] If workers are allowed to determine the affairs of a firm, then does not this result in laziness and truancy, a reduction in production, and functionary-type work?

[Answer] I have no knowledge of any firms in which the decisionmaking process is completely in the hands of the workers (unless directors are included) so that I cannot answer this question. Instead, well-planned participatory systems result in an increase in initiative, productivity, and satisfaction. There is sufficient proof of this from actual experience.

[Question] Do you intend to bring an end to the market economy system?

[Answer] We do not. Even with their deficiencies -- and sad to say, they do exist --- the markets are more effective than any known masters of economic development. Their use as a control mechanism is not necessarily even an ideological question. Today's situation also points out that blind faith in the forces of the market is not justified. This would presuppose that people would only have an instinct, muscles, and a mouth. But people also have a mind and heart. Therefore, social democracy is needed.

10576
CSO: 3107/105

SOVIET OFFICIAL: CPSU BACKS CENTER PARTY POLICIES

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 8 Apr 82 p 8

[Article: "Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid Pact Will Not Be Changed or Interpreted"]

[Text] At his party's seminar on the YYA [Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid] Agreement on Wednesday Center Party Chairman Paavo Vayrynen condemned all talk about the superfluousness of the YYA Agreement, speculations about changing the agreement, and new interpretations of the agreement.

According to Vayrynen there is no need or justification to change the YYA Agreement, "also we do not need any new interpretations of the agreement".

Talk that the agreement has become superfluous as a result of the changed international situation is according to Vayrynen "lacking in any basis and an indication of a complete inability to evaluate".

Such was recently suggested and proposed by Professor of Political Science Dag Anckar of Abo [Turku] Academy.

Vayrynen stated that Finland did not conclude the YYA Agreement because of economic trends, but for the reason that the YYA Agreement corresponds with the lasting security policy interests of Finland.

"It is clear that the YYA Agreement will be continued in an unchanged form for the duration of the agreed upon period of validity. A suitable time will be chosen between the parties, naturally, in a situation of good mutual understanding," stated Vayrynen. The YYA Agreement will now remain in effect until 1990.

The majority of Vayrynen's speech was devoted to the merits of President Urho Kekkonen's and the Agrarian League/Center Party's foreign policy. Vayrynen emphasized how the Agrarian League under Kekkonen's leadership cleared the path and formulated the present foreign policy line and later became President Kekkonen's strongest, most consistent, and most unselfish supporter.

Now the Center Party is according to Vayrynen prepared to give all its support to the new president in carrying out the Paasikivi-Kekkonen foreign policy line.

CPSU Trusts in Leadership of Center Party

Editor-in-Chief P. I. Rumyantsev of EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA, who spoke at the YYA seminar of the Center Party, stated that the highest leadership of the Soviet Communist Party had declared "its certainty that the Center Party will continue to be among those social forces in Finland on which the direction of Finland's foreign policy is built". According to him the CPSU leadership is also certain that the Center Party will consistently continue to develop the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line and the line of the YYA Agreement.

Rumyantsev mentioned the names of Urho Kekkonen, Arvo Korsimo, and Kauno Kleemola as formulators of this foreign policy line. "The new young and energetic generation in the party leadership will consistently continue this line," he stated.

He also stated that the new president, Mauno Koivisto, said in his campaign speeches and in recent discussions with the Soviet leadership in Moscow that Finland's foreign policy will continue to adhere to the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line.

10576
CSO: 3107/105

BRIEFS

CHRISTIAN PARTY'S WESTERHOLM REMAINING--Raino Westerholm, Christian League chairman and forester, still wants to continue in his party's leadership. He announced this at a meeting of the party's executive council. Thus the congress of the Christian League will have only to approve the reelection of Westerholm. However, Vice Chairman Impi Muroma intends to resign and a new name is being sought primarily from the women's organization for her replacement. [Text] [Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 2 Apr 82 p 5] 10576

FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS NAMED--Ambassador Richard Muller was appointed chief of the Foreign Ministry's political section on Thursday. The Council of State submitted a stipulation according to which Muller will occupy this position for the time being, but until the end of this year. The government decided on the appointment of a new chief for the Foreign Ministry's political section in this way since the actual holder of this post, Klaus Tornudd, has obtained a leave of absence until the end of the year. Tornudd is acting as a professor of political science at Helsinki University. Richard Muller's actual appointment will then occur later. Muller recently acted as director of Finland's CSCE delegation to the follow-up meeting in Madrid. Previously, he has been an ambassador, in Tanzania, among other places, as well as a consultant in the Foreign Ministry. Foreign affairs counselor Erkki Maentakanen will act as assistant chief of the political section until the end of June. Jaakko Blomberg, the new assistant section chief, will assume his duties in the beginning of July. [Excerpt] [Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 2 Apr 82 p 8] 10576

BADINTER OUTLINES EXTRADITION POLICY, ASYLUM GUIDELINES**Commentary on Changing Policy**

Paris LE MONDE in French 23 Feb 82 p 1

[Text] Little by little, France's policy on extradition is being clarified. France wants to be a land of asylum--and has proved this since 10 May 1981--but it had lacked a doctrinal foundation for this policy.

On Saturday, 20 February, during a colloquium sponsored in Paris by the Law and Democracy Association, Mr Badinter [minister of justice] filled in this policy gap. As he defined it, this doctrine is intended to be both flexible in application and firm in principle.

The minister of justice considers it useless to attempt to define a political crime. And consequently, it is useless to prejudge France's attitude about requests for extradition. Reality, like the conflicts which arise on this planet, is multiple, difficult to grasp, and takes on changing shapes. The line separating the freedom fighter from the criminal is a shifting one.

France is reserving for itself the right to make its decisions on a case-by-case basis. This is a change in policy, for until 10 May 1981, the perpetrators of serious crimes were automatically turned over to their country, no matter what their political motivations might be.

While it is impossible to draw a set line dividing resistance from terrorism, France does intend to follow certain principles. There will be no extradition, says Mr Badinter, to countries which do not respect human rights, and whose penitential and judicial systems have only a distant relation to the concept of democracy. Countries suspected of using torture, such as Turkey, Spain, and more recently, Italy, are implicitly designated here.

The outlines of France's new extradition policy have now been drawn. The pragmatism which has prevailed until the present is beginning to yield to a relatively precise doctrine. This theoretical clarification is especially interesting, as the ideas which Mr Badinter expressed this weekend give us a fairly precise image of the way in which the laws governing extradition might soon be modified.

Badinter on Policy Details

Paris LE MONDE in French 23 Feb 82 p 10

[Text] At the colloquium on extradition sponsored on 20 February in Paris by the Law and Democracy Association, Mr Badinter, expressing "his personal views," stressed the "illusory" nature, in his opinion, of attempts to define political crimes. This issue has been the subject of controversy for some years, for both French law and the agreements signed by France with other nations forbid the extradition of criminals who allege political motivations, although the concept has never been clearly explained in the law.

Mr Badinter said: "Any attempt at definition in this area seems to me bound to fail, because of the infinite complexity of reality. In this area, reality is multiple, difficult to grasp, and it constantly takes on new dimensions which were unknown in the past. This truth can not be covered by legal formalizations." Mr Badinter then added: "Everyone knows that at certain times, in certain countries, recourse to violence may appear to be the ultimate means of political opposition, as the only possible method... to use against political leaders who completely ignore the principles of freedom."

"And in the opposite case," said the minister of justice, "there are deeds of considerable violence... which revolt the human conscience. Their perpetrators, no matter what their ideological motivations, can only be treated as criminals violating the fundamental laws of free nations."

Mr Badinter then commented that no matter what ruling may be issued by the courts, "in the final instance, the government always reserves for itself the option to reject extradition, while still respecting its treaties." France will do so, he said, if the person whose extradition is requested risks the penalty of death if he is returned to his own country. "That will also be the case," he added, "if the situation of the person whose extradition is being sought may be aggravated, either de facto or de jure, because of his race, religion, or beliefs,

or may simply be seriously compromised by penal legislation which we feel does not adequately respect human rights, or even by the poor operation of judicial institutions, or of that nation's penitential administration."

However, stated the minister of justice, the French government will not allow persons seeking refuge on its soil to take advantage of their situation to prepare or carry out actions sanctioned by our criminal laws. "France can not be transformed into a haven for criminals or a sanctuary."

The minister of justice then explained that France "could not adopt a policy of systematically rejecting extradition requests." In particular, "it could not accept the development of an international organized movement involved in common law crimes," under the pretext that the extradition agreements it has with some European countries date back to the 19th century.

To remedy this situation, the French government plans to initiate "diplomatic actions." The minister of justice said that there could be no question of allowing certain new types of crimes, such as crimes against the environment or economic crimes, to develop. The international dimension of such actions is quite clear. "In this respect," he said, "the law on extradition must be renewed."

Diplomatic, Legal Ramifications

Paris LE MONDE in French 23 Feb 82 p 10

[Article by Bertrand Le Gendre]

[Text] France intends to be a land of asylum. To date, this principle, proclaimed in June by Pierre Mauroy, has had hardly any exceptions. But this position is hard to maintain. On several occasions there has been some diplomatic friction, because French law does not really fit the new extradition policy. This is the origin of the proposal, favored by Mr Badinter, to change the law.

This law is such that, when the court issues a favorable ruling on an extradition request, the government is caught in a difficult position. It must both ignore the legal ruling, and reject the request made by another country. There is nothing wrong with this legally, but the situation is hardly a comfortable one. Caught between a rock and a hard place, so far it has held firm. No Basque, whose extradition has been sought by Madrid, has been returned, despite a chorus of protests by the Spanish, rarely heard before the present time.

Still, the French government admits it did make a mistake in allowing the extradition of an Italian neo-fascist. In this case, the prime minister had supported the arguments of the French judicial system which felt that this person had acted in violation of common law. But after a more thorough review of the case, the government today recognizes that it should have opposed this extradition, as it has done for the Basques. Important principles must be respected, no matter what the political coloring of the person who may benefit from the application of these principles. Now that it has made its self-criticism, the government is preparing to refuse to turn over to Italy another prisoner whose extradition is being sought by her country; she is also a neo-fascist.

Though clear, France's attitude is no less uncomfortable on diplomatic terms. This case has arisen while Mr Mitterrand is going to Rome on an official visit this week. Other incidents may arise which may prove embarrassing to the government. At that point, the following question arises: how can we protect principles while still maintaining good relations with friendly countries? In reality, when we look at the policy followed since the change in administration, we find two successive phases. The first is the one observed with regard to Madrid: a pure and simple refusal to extradite.

The second phase is marked by the use of a legal maneuver, which has worked well so far. It consists of stopping the problem at its source, by no longer sending extradition requests to the courts. As soon as a case with political implications is reported by Interpol, it is examined by the bureau of international crime repression assistance of the ministry of justice, which blocks the move. In Paris, the courts take the same action. The result: such cases are no longer sent to the courts, there is no danger of a favorable ruling, and no fear of diplomatic complications. The system is working so well that today there are no extradition cases pending in the courts--political extraditions, that is.

This solution does have the advantage of flexibility and, most of all, discretion. As the government no longer has to give official notification of an extradition rejection, it eliminates protests from friendly countries, which are all the more indignant the more public the matter is. This discretion facilitates an amicable resolution through traditional bilateral channels, instead of hardening the positions of each party.

Still the risk remains of having other cases burst out into broad daylight. For example, two foreign terrorists, a West

German woman and a Swiss man, were arrested by chance in Paris on 16 February. As the matter is public, it will be hard to short-circuit the courts. And this will bring in all the disadvantages we mentioned earlier.

A Dilemma

To escape from this dilemma, the government really has only one solution: to change the law. Nothing is definite yet, but an outline was drawn up on Saturday, 20 February, at the close of the colloquium on law and democracy, by the president of the association, Jacques Ribs, an attorney at the Elysee, and by Paul Bouchet, a former bar official in Lyon, who is a member of the commission to revise the penal code. These ideas represent only the personal views of their authors, but they do generally coincide with Mr Badinter's concerns, and give a fairly precise idea of the modifications that could be made.

The government feels that the law of 1927 on extradition, as it has been applied to date, is not satisfactory. It forbids the extradition of persons charged with political crimes, but does not define this concept in any way. Therefore, the courts generally rule that a political violation of "particular gravity" can be considered a crime under common law, which justifies the extradition of its perpetrator.

To eliminate such interpretations, Messrs Bouchet and Ribs suggest that the law make it clear that extradition is impossible "whenever there are serious reasons to believe that the request, motivated by a common law violation, has been filed in order to prosecute or punish an individual for considerations of race, religion, nationality, or political beliefs, or that the situation of that person may be aggravated by one or another of these reasons."

In addition, extradition would also be impossible "if there are serious risks that the human rights of the person sought for extradition, rights as defined by the constitution of the French republic and by the agreements it has signed, would not be adequately protected." Such a change in the law would force the courts to question the risks of torture incurred by the Spanish Basques or by Red Brigade members who may have sought refuge in France, if returned to their homelands.

Obsolete Agreements

It seems probable that the law of 1927, if modified in this way, would have prevented the extradition of Klaus Croissant and of Francisco Piperno, accused of involvement in the kidnapping of Aldo Moro. Finally, if the protection sought by Messrs Bouchet and Ribs had existed, they would have benefited from the right to appeal to both the Supreme Court and the Council of State. At present, such recourse is practically impossible for the Supreme Court, and the Council of State can not overturn such a ruling. These two jurisdictions would have to issue a verdict within 1 month. The value of such recourse is clear. In case a ruling was overturned or canceled, the government would be able to use this judicial decision to reject extradition. No longer would the government be on the front line, but rather, the matter would be in the hands of independent magistrates.

For the moment, Mr Badinter is aware of the unhappiness caused abroad by France's asylum policy. While standing firm on principle, he wants to soothe his foreign counterparts, by making some commitments to them: "France will not become either a haven for criminals or a sanctuary," he said on Saturday. Moreover, France will soon take some diplomatic initiatives in order to renew international penal cooperation, particularly in the areas of pollution and economic crimes. The minister of justice is right to point out the obsolete nature of the treaties binding France to some of its partners, and the urgency of moving ahead on judicial agreements within Europe. For example, the extradition agreement between France and the Netherlands, which dates back to 1895, calls for the mutual extradition of their nationals guilty of abortion or bigamy, but not that of drug traffickers.

This initiative on the part of France is understandable. France does not want to appear to be blocking all international crime repression assistance at the time when the proposal for a European judicial space, a plan favored by Messrs Giscard d'Estaing and Peyrefitte, seems definitely dead and buried. This plan had called for the automatic extradition of the perpetrators of most political crimes. That is an idea whose time now seems past.

7679

CSO: 3100/611

JOSPIN ON PCI, PSF TIES; EUROLEFT, PACIFISM, ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

Rome PAESE SERA in Italian 13 Apr 82 p 5

[Interview with Lionel Jospin, secretary of the PSF by Giorgio Fanti, date not specified at PSF headquarters and at Jospin's home on 11 Apr 82]

[Text] Paris, April--Forty-four years old, 11 years in the Socialist Party that has risen from the ashes of the SFIO, 2 years as its first secretary: Lionel Jospin is in every sense a new man in French politics. Given the position and given his relationship with the president--he was elected by the PS, but chosen by Mitterrand--Jospin is one of the decisive figures in the new power of the Left. The initiative was his, and naturally Berlinguer's, for their meeting on 30 March here in Paris. Much has been written about it, but I felt it useful to verify its significance in an interview with Jospin who took more than 3 hours out of his most busy schedule for our meetings: twice at the offices of the PS on Solferino Street and a third time at his home, near Luxembourg on Easter Sunday, shortly before his departure for the United States. A few days earlier, Jospin had participated at the Bonn meeting of the Presidency of the Socialist Internationale, where his meeting with Berlinguer was widely discussed.

[Question] After Poland and the positions taken by the PCI, you stated that "they could represent a turning point in the history of the labor movement." Can you say that this is still true, after the meeting with Berlinguer?

[Answer] The doubt and hope still remain. If it is a turning point, it will not be a sharp one. The PCI is tied to the land, history and culture of Italy, but is also marked by the communist tradition. Would a too sharp turn pull it away from its communist roots? This is a fear that I seem to have noticed. If the evolution of the PCI continues, other leftist forces will evolve in Europe. And the movement outlined by the French Socialist Party will not remain isolated.

[Question] I would like to clarify the significance of the meeting with Berlinguer, that is, between the secretaries of the two major parties from the two separate wings of the labor movement....

[Answer] To be honest, I am not really sure that we are the largest European socialist party. However, we are in power. In the past, Berlinguer and

Mitterrand have had meetings. But they were meetings of personalities, held on neutral territory. This time, they met as party chiefs at the seat of the PS to discuss all the political problems and launch a common initiative. As this is the first time since 1920, the event is strongly symbolic.

[Question] Did you and the PCI decide to have the meeting in the same way?

[Answer] I think not; the PS confronted it in the continuity of its own positions: condemnation of mass repression in the Eastern countries did not represent anything new for us. Instead, the PCI accentuated its distance from a historical movement that was decisive to it. The PS affirmed its place in the international socialist movement. The PCI contested its place in the communist movement. The PCI, therefore, has had to move more than we have. And it undoubtedly deserves more credit.

[Question] Berlinguer would say that the evolution of the PCI has been very great...

[Answer] That is true. But there is a moment in which a change in quantity brings about a change in quality. Berlinguer told me clearly that the PCI did not in the least intend to become social democratic. And we do not ask it of him. But I wonder about the significance of a movement launched by this powerful party. A national communism? Tito controlled the state, yet in any case, Yugoslavia was not the flower of liberty.

[Question] Yours and the PCI's coming together on the "new internationalism" again implicates some differences: you privilege relations with parties of the Socialist Internationale, the PCI privileges no one...

[Answer] We are members of the Socialist Internationale: therefore we have brother parties, in Italy as elsewhere. But we have greatly developed our relations with some communist parties, and above all with progressive movements in the Third World. Why? Because relationships of exploitation and domination that exist between social classes in our countries are also found in relationships between nations on an international scale. This reality and the awareness of it justify this "new internationalism."

[Question] Can a recomposition of the labor movement be made with this method?

[Answer] On a short term basis, no. Sixty years of history, conflicts, and reciprocal exclusions are not swept away in the space of a few years. The step taken together by the PCI and the PS involves, for the moment, only the two parties. There are impediments on this road. But the fact of having identified them, of having discussed them in a friendly and lucid fashion is important.

[Question] But when you have both talked of the European Left, haven't you gone beyond your two parties?

[Answer] Europe exists, so does the Left. But the two are cut in half. In the East, the socialist current is prohibited. And I am sure that it is potentially strong. In the West, the communist parties are often marginal, and the social democratic parties dominate. In the few countries in which the

socialist and communist forces coexist, understanding is not always good. So we are frank: the Euroleft does not yet exist. But despite the Alps, the initiative launched by a communist party and a socialist party impresses the others. I am convinced of it, especially after the conversations I had at the recent Presidium of the Socialist Internationale.

[Question] Doesn't launching an initiative mean dragging along the others, especially the "reluctant partners" Craxi and Marchais?

[Answer] I do not know if Marchais is reluctant. Perhaps Berlinguer could ask him when they meet in May. But we govern with him. As far as Craxi is concerned, I understand that he has the problem of affirming the existence of his party. Italy, too, I believe, needs a strong socialist current. In any case, the French PS has absolute respect for the independence of other parties. It is up to him to decide whether to join us or not. But one can always try to convince them.

[Question] Both of you have talked of a "third way." What do you mean?

[Answer] In predicting a "third way," the PCI seems to exclude the classic communist and social democratic ways. But what, in practice, distinguishes the "third way" from the communist model? I have not obtained a precise answer. And then, I am less severe than Berlinguer concerning social democratic experiences.

[Question] And the fundamental question: surpass capitalism or stay with it?

[Answer] It is true that these experiences have not permitted a departure from capitalism. But they have assured some victories for the working classes, and a capacity for organization and expression that does not exist in the Eastern countries. They have not gone as far, but at least they have avoided the strong regression back to dictatorship or authoritarianism that have come about in all the communist countries.

[Question] But don't you, too, want to distinguish yourselves from those social democratic experiences?

[Answer] We are a socialist, not a social democratic party. We want to arrive, through progressive action, at breaking with capitalism, not just administrate it better. In this sense, the idea of a "third way" interests us. But we maintain that it is very close to the pathways that we are following. In this sense, there is motive for discussion, perhaps divergence with the PCI.

[Question] Why have you chosen the two themes--analysis of the crisis and prospectives for the labor movement--as the principle basis for common study by the PS and the PCI?

[Answer] The return to crisis is the dominant characteristic of the present period. And undoubtedly because of this, the expression "retro" infiltrates everywhere: in art, in culture, in ideology, even in international relations.

The Malvinas Islands conflict between a dictatorship and a conservative government smacks of the 19th century..."

[Question] You were speaking of the crisis...

[Answer] In analyses of the crisis, I was affected by the conversations with Berlinguer. And above all by the fact that the crisis of systems in the East is superimposed on the crisis of capitalism. Over there, it is clear that other Polands will arise. Here in the West, the risk is in seeing the economic and social bases that have permitted social democratic reforms disappear. A more advanced but more democratic socialism, or a very reactionary turning back? This is the decisive step.

[Question] Why the other theme, that of political and strategic prospectives?

[Answer] As far as our respective evolutions were concerned, I had many questions for Berlinguer. Can the present system in the East be considered socialist? Can a communist party conceive of itself in a purely national framework? Does the PCI always attribute the role of being in the avantgarde to itself? Does it intend to maintain democratic centralism? Berlinguer, too, certainly had many questions for me. Lacking time, we stopped on the threshold of many points.

[Question] But at your last directive committee and at the secretarial seminar, didn't you ask yourselves basically similar questions?

[Answer] I do not think that we have the same types of problems. We have mainly practical problems to resolve because of our coming to power. They are often big problems: for example, how to get a policy of profound reforms passed democratically in a capitalistic country. The PS questions its actions. The PCI, instead, must question its existence. It is obviously a large and strong party. It is obviously proud of its traditions, roots and place in Italian society. But I feel that the "break" that is has accentuated with the classic communist model poses identity problems for it.

[Question] But don't you also have an analogous problem in wishing to surpass the social democratic ways?

[Answer] Do not forget that the new PS, born in 1971 at the Epinay Congress, was born from a reopening of discussion through a self-critical process in the old SFIO party, and from the coming together of other initiatives, chiefly Mitterrand's. We have, then, already made the break. That we are an imperfect instrument is evident. But we prefer it. The society of the perfect...

[Question] Doesn't exist...

[Answer] Not only, but it disturbs me. The society of the imperfect, instead, reassures me. In the history of societies, one often sees the aggressiveness of totalinarianism behind the mask that aims at perfection.

[Question] I think Berlinguer would agree. Do you both also agree on the theoretical references that will have to sustain your initiative?

[Answer] I do not overly believe in the necessity--presented as if it were a scientific necessity--of referring to a body of doctrine. I am not very religious.

[Question] Yet today, no one can start over with theory as if it were a dogma established once and for all. Principles born from reality and continually confronted with it are needed. Isn't empiricism as great an evil as dogmatism?

[Answer] Certainly. But a certain number of principles that can guide socialist thought and action already exists.

[Question] But where should they be searched for? In Gramsci? In Austro-Marxism? In the socialist traditions, but which ones?

[Answer] There are many test tubes lined up on the shelf of our historic memory. We do not believe in a miraculous theoretical remedy. There are the bases of Marxism, the intuitions of the Utopians, the results of the scientific method in the study of social phenomena, practical constructions coming from the world of labor, and then, criticism of existing social systems. An effort for synthesis, not dogmatism, is needed.

[Question] Do you perhaps mean, as someone--Marx--has already said, that one must proceed to concrete analysis from concrete situations?

[Answer] Exactly. And more than enough material is furnished by successful bourgeois revolutions, unsuccessful proletarian revolutions, triumphant and precarious fascism, the complex movements in the Third World.

[Question] Is your collaboration with the PCI anticipated only on the level of theory, or also between two parties as such?

[Answer] There will be participation mixed with theoretical discussions. But I believe more in discussion between responsible parties than in meetings between experts. The great problems facing us are basically simple problems that must be dealt with on a political level.

[Question] In your answers, a big question always comes out: how to combine principles with reality. For example, the identification that has evolved from the last meeting of the PS directive committee between government and party action: can't it, in the extreme, end up in the identification of party to state that is criticized in the USSR?

[Answer] The comparison does not hold up. Here there is pluralism, there a single party. Even if we were identified with the state--and this is not the case--the consequences would be totally different. Let us therefore put aside the comparison and pose the problem in its real terms: that of the role of the PS in the face of a power that does not emanate only from it. Mitterrand was not elected only by socialists.

[Question] Then what is the role of the PS?

[Answer] The PS must remain a force in French society, it must not be confused with the workings of the state and be absorbed by institutions. Its function is to express socialist ideas. No one else can do this: neither the president of the Republic nor the government. It is an unsubstitutable role, chiefly for delineating prospectives.

[Question] Again on principles and reality: another example, the Middle East policy, on which I believe you are not in agreement with the PCI. If the present policy is perhaps defendable on a national level, why don't you, as a party, keep in mind a liberation group as important as the PLO?

[Answer] Let us separate the two problems: if there is divergence with the PCI, let us talk about it. But in this case, there is no divergence between the PS and the government. The speech made by the president of the Republic at the Knesset expresses correct positions. Sooner or later they will be relevant. There is too much of a crusader spirit in the Middle East. It is not our policy to be allied with one camp or another.

[Question] Another example: the pacifist movement in Europe and strategic equilibrium. Your government represents a type of antamodel for the West. Thus your prudence concerning the strategic questions that press the Americans is understandable. But why don't you, the PS, take into account the new data which represent, in Europe and the United States, the push towards disarmament and pacifism? Why be detached, as well, from positions that dominate the Labor Party or that condition the SPD?

[Answer] We approve of government policy and the position of the president. However, there are great possibilities for initiatives by the party in this field. As far as the parties mentioned are concerned, I would say that the Labor Party has taken an "extreme" opposition position and has abandoned the government. This has already happened. Our positions are not contraopposed to those of the SPD.

[Question] Another example of the difficulties of getting principles and reality together: how can we get away from the logic of blocks? How can we get away from Yalta?

[Answer] It seems to me that the PCI and the PS have a common analysis of the logic of blocks. To get away, the first thing to do is not to interiorize it in one's own analysis. Further: not to reduce the mass of international relations to only East-West dimensions: North-South problems are equally explosive. Our Latin-American policy is an illustration of this: down there, the alternative is not between the USSR and the United States, but between liberty and oppression, between misery and dictatorship. Finally, one has to facilitate possible evolutions, protecting oneself from every provocative attitude. Theoretically, every member country of an alliance is free to get out of it. But when facts are involved, one hopes that a certain elasticity is created internally within the blocks.

[Question] However, Mitterrand has spoken of the necessity for redefining the Atlantic Alliance. What do you mean by this?

[Answer] The Atlantic Alliance is a historical and diplomatic reality for us. We are a part of it because we do not have a better security system. We socialists are not concerned with an ideological or political viewpoint. To redefine it means that we are assuring ourselves that it is adapted to the present period, and that it guarantees exactly the commitments of everybody.

[Question] Meanwhile, Europe does not count, it has fallen into absolute stasis: the European Councils are chats without consequence, the Parliament has no breath, common policies do not exist, except for the agrarian policy, and we know how that works. How do we get away from this humiliating impotence?

[Answer] We must give some aims to the EEC. I see essentially two. The first: to fight against crises, come to grips with unemployment, fix the objectives of social progress, and then talk, on this base, with the great partners, the United States and Japan. The second: starting with what already exists--in particular Lome--to develop an innovative policy towards the Third World. Europe is strong enough to give it something, but not strong enough to run the risk of domination.

[Question] Isn't that still, I feel, a great policy, for a Europe independent from both Moscow and Washington, and returned to its geographical boundaries...

[Answer] Historically, this prospective is more than hoped for: it is necessary. On a middle term basis, I am not too optimistic. We can talk with the East European countries, exchange products and culture over the wall that divides old Europe. But the wall is there to impede renewed unity of the civilization. We will get there, but later on.

[Question] To conclude: we live in a period of fallen ideals. I believe that there is a need for indicating "concrete utopias." Can the Euroleft be one of these?

[Answer] Yes. And then, the meeting between the PS and the PCI was just that: a concrete and slightly utopian act.

9941
CSO: 3104/178

PCF CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON RIGHTS, POWERS OF WORKERS

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 19 Apr 82 p 4

[Text] The PCF Central Committee adopted last Friday a document on the rights and powers of workers, which we are publishing below:

In taking a stand for change, the workers have expressed their desire that social progress serve as a guide for the conduct of affairs at all levels.

Faced with the heritage of the past, with the obstacles and exclusive decisions of capital for its profits, with the difficult problems of getting out of the crisis, the implementation of this new policy implies an always more extensive involvement of all the interested parties.

In fact, to obtain a lasting improvement of employment and social progress, it is necessary to create conditions for a new growth and a more effective and different management. Consequently we must get off the beaten pathways. A new policy must open up the way for it with ambition and realism.

We intend to question excessive privileges, "the divine right" of the employers, who oppose the search for positive solutions. A breath of freedom must blow through all enterprises. At work, women, men and young people must be considered full citizens.

The workers are not making exorbitant demands, they want to be respected and listened to. With their representatives and their democratic organizations, they must always be playing a greater role in the management of affairs. The spirit of delegation of power, which is deeply rooted in our country, must decline at the same time.

It is the measure of effectiveness, responsibility and the key to success. Such is the policy of we communists. We make the question of democracy in the enterprise the decisive basis of democratic progress on all levels. That is why, on the occasion of the great reforms regarding the rights of workers, reforms which must take place soon, we want to give our opinion.

1. Use all Positive Gains Fully, Raise the Historic Limits

It is at the cost of many and great struggles that the workers have won, especially in the period of advances of the popular movement in 1936, 1945 and 1968, rights and new means of expressing and defending their interests: shop stewards, plant committee, health and safety committee, employer-worker committee, recognition of trade union rights...

That was always accomplished against the will of the employers and those privileged with wealth and the governments at their service. They have continually done everything to question, distort and corrupt these democratic achievements.

Repression, especially against members of the communist party and the CGT, refusals to enforce labor law, the laws, infringement of freedoms amount to tens of thousands every year. In some plants it is still the rule to "work and keep quiet!"

"Company unions" serving the managements have been set up. Trade union division has also operated in favor of the employers. With the crisis, blackmail with unemployment, to reduce personnel, the CNPF [National Council of French Employers] and the Giscardian government have expanded their authoritarian method and involvement in capital's negative schemes.

Ending these practices, enforcing and having the law and the labor laws enforced, granting enterprise committees, stewards, and trade unions their role, their rights and their jurisdiction, is a basic requirement.

Certain legal arrangements such as the prerogatives of enterprise committees in economic and financial matters are not used and often even ignored by the workers.

It also should be observed that the labor movement itself is not always fully aware of all its conquests. In fact, the justified refusal of class collaboration used by the employers and some reformist organizations, but also the tendency to delay the solution of great problems in the expectation of a complete transformation of society have often led the labor movement to lack interest in what involves management. A field where the employers and managements monopolize the decisions and standards which have led to the crisis, unemployment and problems.

2. For a New Effective Advance of the Rights of Workers

To overcome the crisis and advance towards a more just, more human, freer society, towards socialism in the French style, it is necessary

to reverse the above negative tendencies, force the exclusive domination of capital to retreat to the point of defeating it. What is on the labor movement's agenda is the implementation of a positive, constructive, aggressive policy.

Step by step, supporting itself on all the achievements, struggling to change facts and consciences, we want to create the conditions for change in life.

The laws and decrees being drawn up, the reforms of planning and decentralization and nationalization can be the basis for great progress. For there to be good laws, good reforms, for nationalizations to meet the expectations of the workers, we must assure the complete exercise of the workers' present rights and establish new effective rights.

With the bills on the rights of workers and their organizations, with the law on democratization of all of the public sector and the decrees on new rights in public service, 1982 must be significant in the history of French legislation. Of course, capital disapproves of these reforms and has started a fierce campaign against the new rights of the workers. This testifies to its determination to continue to do everything to not enforce, limit or alter the measures which attack its privileges, as well as a financial return, which is exclusively guided by profit.

Such is the only purpose of its operation to undermine the class and mass trade union organization, the CGT, reduce the role of the enterprise committees, employer-worker committees, health and security committees, alter the goals of worker medicine, hamper the activities of shop stewards, assure itself control of social policy at the enterprise, in administration and services. Our policy is the opposite.

We desire, in the first place, that on all levels trade union organizations have more facilities to fulfill their fundamental assignment, which is protecting the worker's interests. Today it is necessary to take advantage of all opportunities, which make it possible to inform, to express ourselves and to negotiate on everything which involves social policy.

In the second place, far from opposing these rights on the social level for involvement in economic management, we consider, on the contrary, that action against the crisis, for change, demands sharing them. In fact, it is necessary to begin to win acceptance for another method of considering employment problems; eliminate instability and inequalities, develop people's consumption through a priority increase of low wages; regain the domestic market, develop technological advances in connection with employment and vocational

training; progressively set up new management standards which favor profitability and social efficiency, democratize administration so that it always may better take over the satisfaction of social needs and those of the nation with the participation of users, elected persons and personnel.

The new laws must encourage this policy. Certainly they will not be sufficient in themselves, no more today than yesterday. The conscious involvement of the workers, their struggles are and will be indispensable. At the same time it is necessary to strengthen measures against the failure to respect rights and against the obstacles to their enforcement.

This struggle for the workers' new rights and power is also the struggle for the recognition of the role and place of the working class and, with it other categories of wage earners, to effectively construct; in short, it is a class struggle.

3. The Priority Decisions Which We Propose

It is not a question here of pointing out in detail our proposals about worker rights. We simply want to express to the workers our point of view about questions which seem critical to us.

a) The Monarchy Must Withdraw in the Enterprise

Enterprises are still too often "fortresses" of modern times, while the economic, political and social role played by the enterprise in the transformation of society makes it a critical area for economic and social progress, for democracy.

The employers deny the wage earners the right to be citizens, as soon as the shop or office door opens. However, they are places where they do their work, an essential social duty.

The workers must have their right of free speech and new social relations must progressively replace the old ones based on authoritarianism, repression, restraint and fear.

It is known that the communists fight seriously and responsibly for the extension of trade union rights and for the recognition of expression and political discussions at the enterprise. Everything which is obtained in this respect is positive.

b) Recognize Fully the Role and Place of the Trade Union

In the implementation of the change, the trade union is a major trump. We must encourage everywhere a genuine recognition of the trade union fact and the development of unionization in all enterprises, all establishments and services.

In making trade union organizations representative of real spokesmen in economic and social life at all levels, in opposing employer pressures aiming at reducing their role and their representativeness, the government can contribute to this extensively.

On the other hand, and we say it frankly, it also is up to the workers to estimate well for themselves the importance of considering themselves fully involved by providing themselves with a trade union organization capable of defending the interests of the working class and all the wage earners in every situation with seriousness and responsibility.

Organizing a union, acting with their labor companions and colleagues, is to already take up the challenge against the monarchy in the enterprise and it is to provide themselves with a force to defend their individual and collective rights.

It is the trade union which negotiates wages, rates, classifications, agreements and company standards.

c) For the Involvement of Workers in Management: the Good Decision is that of the Enterprise Committee.

If the right to speak, the right to defend oneself are elementary rights which are still too often flouted, they are not enough.

In fact, the problems which the wage earners, the enterprises and the country in general face today demand a greater responsibility and a link between social demands and involvement in management.

To do this, the workers have an incomparable trump acquired on liberation: the enterprise committee.

Legislation on the enterprise committees which developed out of the patriotic and democratic struggle of the liberation did not limit their role to only the management of social, cultural and sport activities. It considered enterprise committees at first as essential spokesmen on economic questions, production, working conditions, qualification and enterprise efficiency.

These rights must be used fully, enterprise committees and CCE [Central Business Committees] must be created everywhere the law allows it and new opportunities for involvement must be opened up.

For analyzing and discussing with plant managers industrial policies, democratic planning, selection of productive investments and technologies to be introduced.

To fight against unemployment, they must be able to have opportunities for appeal before arbitrary decisions for shutdowns or mass layoffs.

The creation of the group committee, taking into account the enterprise committee's recommendations and suggestions on the subject of planning and plant contracts, their involvement in the field of regular and vocational training especially, will be from now on an essential means of involving the enterprise in the direction of real progress in qualification, productivity and activity.

Thus on the basis of new provisions of the regulation on vocational training of young people, 16 to 18 years old, the enterprise committees and the trade union delegates must be able to welcome and follow the training of the young people in the plant. It is an advance which we have the responsibility of fully utilizing.

Giving full scope to the role of the enterprise committee implies a genuine change in information about the enterprise's economic and financial market, plans, research, scientific and technological opportunities and the environment.

This information must no longer be the sole possession of the employers or managements, in its processing, as well as in its distribution. The enterprise committees, the CCE's and the group committees must also have the same facilities to process or have available information, which is more usable for the workers on the environment of enterprises and present relations on the regional, national and international level.

New relationships must be established between the enterprise committees, the local employment committees, the region, planning for the purpose of winning the battle of employment and recovering the domestic market.

In the same way, the health, safety and working conditions committees must have genuine facilities for inquiry and investigation. Quite especially their recommendations must be taken into consideration about the design of equipment at the time of study and production.

These committees must be able to stop any production process which is dangerous for the workers and the environment. A close link must be maintained between CiHS [Hygiene and Security Committee] and labor medicine whose organizations and decisions must be completely independent of employer authority.

For the enterprise committees as well as for the health and safety committees and the employer-worker committees of public service, the number of paid elected persons and their facilities must be increased to allow them to fully carry out their assignment.

d) Develop Worker Democracy

As regards the shop stewards, their daily contact with companions and colleagues on the job, the knowledge of their problems, their opinions, and their suggestions make them the favored spokesmen of the workers. There must be enough of them, especially in the large enterprises and protected against assignments which aim at isolating them from the workers or to swamp them in almost continuous meetings which keep them away from the work place. So many practices which are often resented bitterly by the wage earners.

It is necessary to put an end to these recognized methods of the employers against the representativeness of the stewards, methods "improved" by setting up parallel networks of company assistants. On the contrary, it is necessary to strengthen the role and effectiveness of the stewards. It is with this policy and the desire to assume responsibility by the largest number of workers for the questions which concern them that we have proposed the idea of shop councils since the 23rd Congress.

It is in some way the general assembly where all the wage earners of the shop or department discuss, suggest and act to improve the situation. Of course, its desires, its proposals must be able to be transmitted and negotiated within the framework of the enterprise's corresponding organizations. According to us, this is why the shop council must not be set up as an additional group which would actually deny the role of trade union organizations, enterprise committees and stewards. Without prejudice to developments which the workers and life will give them, that seems today the most realistic and fair position.

e) To Make the Public and Nationalized Sector a Pilot Sector for Worker Involvement

Beyond provisions of a general nature about the role and place of trade unions, enterprise committees and CHS's and shop stewards, the public and nationalized sector provides the opportunity for an advance in this essential field of worker participation in management. The previous gains of the nationalized sector must, of course, be confirmed and all of the new public and nationalized sector must be the spearhead to go forward towards economic and social democracy.

An essential support in the struggle against unemployment, the recovery of the domestic market, the development of research and cooperation, the expanded public and nationalized sector must prove its capacity to achieve these new objectives, including in the competitive framework where it is placed. New standards of management are necessary for that. It is not in aping the behavior and management of the multinationals that we will contribute to reducing unemployment and

getting our country out of the crisis. However, we confirm from the present moment that the internal and external pressures are very strong to continue the above methods which conflict with the objectives of the new policy.

The workers in the public and nationalized sector are directly involved in outlining and achieving these objectives, these standards and consequently their inclusion in management is a concrete demand today.

On the level of the board of directors:

The representatives of the wage earners must have genuine facilities to fully play their new role and we think that they must be offered by representative trade union organizations. It is a question there, in fact, besides the aspect of responsibility which that implies, of respect for a right acquired in our country by all the trade union elections, a right which the employers continued to question for many years to attempt to weaken the representativeness of the CGT class and mass organization.

Democratization must involve the parent company and the affiliates.

As soon as the 50 percent line is crossed, the workers in the affiliates are to enjoy all the rights of representativeness and involvement and for this reason must be connected with management, beside the representatives of the parent company and the public authorities in the boards of directors.

In a general way, public participation must be a basis for taking into account the interests and rights of the workers and the country.

The enterprise committees of the public sector must be able to fully play their positive role in the public and nationalized sector. It would be unnatural for their opinions and their proposals to be ignored or considered as of minor importance. This is particularly true in drawing up enterprise contracts and job, production and competitive contracts.

Finally, we want to attract the workers' attention to an important question: for the affiliates, it is a question of giving back shares of the state to the private sector. These negative operations for the public sector's efficiency should only take place after a recommendation of the board of directors and the enterprise committee, followed by a legislative or regulatory decision. In any case, it should be possible to delay the recommendation of the board of directors on the petition of at least three administrators appealing to the Supreme Council of the public sector.

After the laws are passed, it will be a struggle to enforce them. The government and parliament have an important responsibility to see to it that the employers are ordered to enforce them and to make the new legislation widely known to all.

This is why we propose that the big information media play their role fully in the field of the rights of workers, in particular, in the form of special broadcasts made under the auspices of representative trade union federations.

Without delay, we appeal to all the workers of the big, as well as the small and medium enterprises to make the most of the rights and powers which are theirs from now on and those which are going to be created.

8490
CSO: 3100/570

SITUATION OF PARTIES AFTER PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 27 Mar 82 pp 10-17

[Article by Dieudonnee ten Berge, Jan Heinemans and Coen van Harten: "Earthquake Beneath the Catshuis"]

[Text] Van Agt happy and unbeatable. Wiegel triumphant and eager to govern. Den Uyl "hit, but not defeated." Terlouw from child prodigy to total loss. A base of social support for this coalition which has disappeared as against a pleasant parliamentary majority for the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] and the VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy]. Terlouw and Den Uyl seated very diffidently at the meeting table in the Catshuis, across from Van Agt quietly leaning back. These are the unavoidable results of the latest elections. True, they concerned the Provincial States, but it would not be the first time for this to cause a rift in the administration. Wiegel hopefully thinks back to the Provincial States elections of 1958 and 1966, which led to a cabinet crisis. The PvdA [Labor Party] rank and file do not understand anything of the New Realism. The D'66 [Democrats '66] fan club is tired of looking at the faded Terlouw idol. If possible, the Wiegel effect had an even greater impact than the Van Agt effect. For Messrs Den Uyl and Terlouw, the margins within the ministerial consultation have become rather narrow. To change their tune seems to be the only "reasonable alternative." The PvdA and the D'66 will have to give in on more than one issue. Because before you know it, Wiegel and Van Agt will be back in Le Bistroquet.

"The Hague out of the Netherlands, beginning with Amsterdam." This is the slogan of a small provo-type political movement in the capital, called The Reaction. A small marginal club, but it does express the uneasy feelings of some 30 percent of the Dutch voters. This percentage acknowledged it on the historic and dramatic 24 March. And it does express its absolute lack of faith, bordering on distrust, in parliamentary democracy.

And it is especially the large -- but not so large anymore -- left, the PvdA and the D'66, which attracts this widespread feeling of uneasiness. The small left scored a moderate gain, won votes on such issues as nuclear arms, nuclear energy, environment (PSP [Pacifist Socialist Party], FPR [Political Party of

Radicals]) and the "maintenance of the standard of living" (CPN [Communist Party of the Netherlands]). Socialists and democrats received catastrophic blows.

The absolute leader of the VVD, Hans Wiegel, seems to have a super-sensitive antenna at his disposal. More than a year ago, he already drew an advance on the D'66 losses, which were not at all visible yet at that time. Those around him felt that he was playing for high stakes with his sharp attacks on the D'66, which he, irrespective of the sensational victory of those democrats who call themselves "really liberal," consistently defined as a hot air balloon.

Jan Terlouw, who manifested himself as the political synthesis of the ideal son-in-law and the Dutch Robert Redford, had barely been called to take on the responsibility of the government, when Wiegel concentrated his criticism concerning the D'66 on the personification of the reasonable alternative. "We will also puncture this balloon," Wiegel announced during the latest parliamentary elections. And his high stakes game turned out not to be bluff poker. Terlouw did not come out ahead in a television confrontation with Wiegel. And the pragmaticist did not succeed in brushing off the liberal like an annoying fly. Wiegel managed in a confrontational debate to convince the viewer that Terlouw was a weak administrator, who allowed himself to be outplayed. By Den Uyl, for example, whom Wiegel then praised to death.

Wiegel has succeeded in the primary task of a politician: To make one's policy clear. Den Uyl and Terlouw have failed spectacularly in this. Den Uyl at least honestly admitted this. In a moving speech, actually more a sermon of exhortation, making use of all the elements acquired by the Calvinist young men's association, sometimes resorting to AJC [Workers Youth Central] practices, quoting Albert Verweij, he confessed his guilt in a preacher's voice: "The PvdA policy has not been well understood by the rank and file." He mentioned the employment policy, the plans for health insurance money, and the conflict with the unions. And, in so many words, the not insignificant contribution of Wim Kok to what he called "a serious defeat."

"A wave of increased conservatism," is the way Den Uyl referred to something which can easily be described as a pull to the right. Den Uyl was also alive to the mass disinterest in what happens in the Hague, in what he called "lack of faith in politics." Or, in the words of Terlouw: "Many people feel that politics is not doing such a good job." Den Uyl plans to "fight the lack of faith." The new realist proved to be an old optimist, because: "We have been hit but not defeated. We are headed for recovery and victories."

Den Uyl admitted his failings: the PvdA had not succeeded in making its policy clear to its own rank and file. Terlouw, on the other hand, actually sought an excuse in it. Because, why did the D'66 lose? "Sixty-eight percent of the people who voted for the D'66 last time, stayed home now." This means that the D'66 did not manage to get one out of every three D'66 voters away from the stove. "There was also," Terlouw stated in a cool and bland manner, "some criticism of my person, but not of my policy." And feeling wronged, he explained the VVD gains as: "The VVD is going to ride on the waves of the spirit of the times." And this was precisely the original intention of the D'66 when this party, which was not free of fashionable flaws, presented itself to the voters as a contemporary party.

Once again looking for an external reason, Terlouw also shouted that it is not easy to win votes, when ruling is so hard in this era: "There is nothing to distribute." Thus overlooking the fact that the VVD did not suffer similar damage during the last government period. And that his coalition partner, the CDA, while governing, irrespective of its partner, is prospering. Even though it must be said that, in contrast with the previous years, this CDA gain is an absolute and not a relative one.

The reaon for the Christian democratic success has to do largely, if not completely, with the Van Agt effect. It cannot be broken. Not even through an "action to change the list head," as was done 5 years ago. In their desperation, the democrats have taken over this terminology to ward off criticism of their leader.

Van Agt now has to govern with a Den Uyl who is sad, but ready to fight and with the weak loser Terlouw. Also with a "social support base" which has been completely swept away from under this administration. And eye to eye with an opposition party, with which it could form a splendid parliamentary majority. "Everywhere, all is well with the CDA," he shouted cheerfully. "Happiness is particularly fitting for me because voters want to support a party which stands in the middle of the storm, a party which does not shy away from asking for sacrifices. I am definitely taking an advance on that beautiful evening coming up in June and that other one -- no, I'm not going to tell you when!"

Koos Postema was proven right when he said on Wednesday evening: "Please, stay by your set; it could become a highly noteworthy evening in Dutch politics. Not only will the impact be sizable on a national basis, we have also had a foretaste of the upcoming council elections, when landslides will also occur in municipal politics."

Apparently, there are quite a number of program groups (the one from Amsterdam, for example) which could no longer or only barely be formed again following the catastrophic PvdA losses and the remarkable liberal gains.

The gun smoke has barely lifted, but yet it is more or less clear what tracks have been left behind by the elections. First of all, last week's calm is gone. Van Agt was in the Far East and that gave the parties some breathing space. Officials and colleagues did "implement through" -- as it is so colorfully called in the Hague jargon -- the necessary scenarios, but there was no need for political decision making; indeed it could not take place. The week prior to the elections was the week of friendly peace. The leaders of the three government parties did not have a fistfight with each other.

Even for Wednesday evening's campaign broadcast on the NOS [Netherlands Broadcasting Foundation], it was agreed not to enter into a direct debate with each other. Vice Prime Minister Den Uyl went the farthest with this flower power feeling. To friend and foe alike he let it be known that during Van Agt's absence a fair amount of progress had been made in solving the budget cut perils. This was then supposed to have taken place within the quartet: himself, Van der Stee, Van Thijn and Terlouw. There were obviously still some technical problems left, not even particularly small ones, but the sun was once again shining on the horizon. Another week or two of further meetings

with Van Agt and the matter could be taken care of. The early implementation of investment wages could be the key to get the matter moving again. Civil servants would also be compelled to take an income reduction. This then would not be used in their own sector, but this recovered money could, for example, provide an extra impulse for the construction industry. Hence, a direct impact on the fight against unemployment.

Den Uyl's approach, strengthened by parliamentary party leader Meijer, was primarily aimed at creating the impression that the crisis clouds were moving away from the administration. The political reality is absolutely different. Barely anything has been solved. Data models are nice, but they don't mean anything unless choices are being made. The same applies to solving social conflicts by breaking the last piggy banks, so that next year the health insurance funds, which are now being picked clean at an accelerated rate, will have to be somewhat filled up again by means of increased contributions. Later on, we will worry about what to do next.

This is also true of the real position of the country's finances. That there is a shortfall of 4.7 billion guilders and a bit, was approximately Van der Stee's message last week during the parliamentary debate on the absence of the spring memorandum. But the shortfall does not amount to a total of 4.7 billion guilders, but is to the tune of 8.7 billion guilders. This sum is as follows. In the meantime then, the very definite budget deficit for 1982 amounts to 4.7 billion guilders. The new shortfalls due to reduced natural gas proceeds, the interest on the national debt and WW [Unemployment Law] benefits amount to 2 billion guilders. The "normal" application of the budget shows 0.5 billion guilders overdrawn. The continued 100 percent net payment of health insurance benefits in the public sector will cost the treasury 0.4 billion guilders. The non-application of a personal contribution for medicines costs 0.1 billion guilders. The closing of the social security funds in 1983 will still cost 0.5 billion guilders this year. And finally, the loose ends of Den Uyl's jobs plan will cost another 0.5 billion guilders. Together -- it is no less than -- 8.7 billion guilders.

At the moment, the CDA and the D'66 are talking about 3 to 4 billion guilders in extra budget cuts. However, it seems increasingly probable that this figure is meant in terms of transactions, an accounting trick to spread the total amount over a longer period of time. This could possibly become part of a compromise with the PvdA. If we look at what it will yield this year (on a cash basis), and that is what really counts, then we get a much lower amount, specifically 1.5 to 2 billion guilders. But with 8.7 billion guilders in shortfalls and 2 billion guilders in budget cuts, it does mean a financing deficit of 8.5 percent and thus not the 6.5 percent which Van Agt and Van der Stee promised. Consequently, there will once again be an increase in crisis rumors. And the somewhat hidden contradictions will once again end up in the Hague offices in all their distressing reality. Only the starting positions have changed.

The socialists once again got a spanking. The cry of despair, called the "new realism," did not seem able to convince the voters. "I have the impression that prior to the elections the Labor Party promised people more than proved to be possible afterwards," said CDA President Piet Bakman affably.

To simply put it honestly, and these words come out of the mouths of several PvdA members of parliament: "The Labor Party is hideously arrogant. And nobody anywhere picks arrogance." In 1977, an arrogant formation policy led to 4 years in the opposition. But, once again, the 53 socialist members of parliament handled this opposition so arrogantly that the voters punished them with a loss of 9 seats. Meanwhile another boundlessly arrogant campaign program was dictated, including six points of contention, of which intelligent socialists immediately said that this way they were putting themselves once again out of the game. And this promptly happened too. One by one, the six points of contention ended up in the waste basket and even the loudly chanted slogan "We are here for the weakest" proved no longer true. Because the promised maintenance of the purchasing power for minimum incomes was quickly reduced to minus 1 percent. You do not have to be politically trained at all to see through this kind of arrogant equivocation. And that was proven too. And then we have not even mentioned the fatal blunder committed by the Den Uyl-Dales duo. Here again it was arrogance which assumed that a socialist minister of social affairs would surely be able to carry the unions. The unions do not pay attention to who introduces a measure, the unions pay attention to the purse.

Even following this new electoral defeat, the two well known groups within the Labor Party are still facing each other: to continue or to split. The "continue" group wants anything but elections. They reckon that they will need at least 2 or 3 years to regain the confidence of leftist Netherlands. Meanwhile, the thing should in Heaven's name be reformed. Even if this means the uncoupling of wages and benefit payments. A great deal of massaging will need to be done to this during the coming summer. Meijer, Van der Louw, Van Dam and Kombrink will have to spend many free evenings visiting the party branches in order to do the necessary conversion work. The Labor Party must once again become a serious and dependable social democratic party without too many nice sounding arrogant action slogans.

The "split" group, however, has not given up yet. It is widely represented in the party leadership and there are also branches in the parliamentary party. As the reasoning goes, to further dirty one's hands by supporting the economic recovery measures of Van Agt, Van der Stee and Terlouw would lead to even further decline. It would lead to a very long term alienation of the union movement.

Love for the D'66 is definitely gone in both groups. The D'66 did not turn out to be the threat it was expected to be; the party has even started being a serious irritation. The CDA comes out in a flattering light. But there are hardly any new supporters. They are still relying on a tough but slowly graying core. Not much new blood is flowing through the arteries. Besides, the CDA is still very busy searching for its own identity. The members of the CDA, who are particularly interested in a witnessing policy, are so terrified of the crisis that they primarily do not talk about it. The CDA-PvdA administration, which had been desired for so long, is in place now and must in Heaven's name remain there. In those circles they are also nearly openly lamenting the fact that the socialists got a spanking. "Only for the sake of the coalition," they say and you hear them thinking: now the unaccountable Dries will probably want to continue with the VVD again.

The pragmaticists within the CDA, who want to turn the party into a stable organization at the center of power, are not waiting for a reversal of alliances. It would give the VVD too much influence. And they have not had the best experiences either with the VVD, which straightforwardly supported the former Specifications policy. A PvdA, which has been brought to great humility, is actually an easier ally. That is not the opinion of the right wing of the CDA. Following a period of self-examination and silence, this wing will certainly be heard from again.

In the D'66 they are going to have to start thinking about a real direction now. Participation in the administration did not produce the expected flowers here either. But here again a great deal was promised which later on could not be delivered and for which the excuse "the fact is that we are part of a coalition administration" had to be used. Amelisweerd, the gas drilling in Ameland, the disposal of radioactive waste in the North Sea, the slow start of Terlouw: all of these matters were annoying for the D'66, which is so clearly directed toward easy political consumption. Even such a quickly rising and unimpeachable star as Laurens Jan Brinkhorst could not straighten the matter. The D'66 will need time to stabilize its primarily a-political rank and file. And that is hard to do with a small rocking boat which is unable to keep its course. Furthermore, Brinkhorst and Terlouw are very well aware of the fact that the CDA and the PvdA would love to offer them a beautiful farewell reception.

For the VVD, being in the opposition simply means gains again. That has been proven before. During the Den Uyl administration, the liberals grew into a real people's party. At that time the VVD attracted, and still does, primarily people who object to an administration with the socialists. Apparently it does not bother VVD voters very much that during an administration with the liberals, investments reached an absolute low, that the financing deficit doubled, that industrial returns tumbled down and that unemployment rose to an unknown height. That first Van Agt administration was certainly not all that brilliant either.

A crisis would be a godsend for the liberals. The climate for economic reform has improved recently under this administration. "The people in the country" know that trees no longer grow until they reach the sky. Van der Stee calls for more pluck. Lubbers wants to drive away the spirit of indolence, and Wiegel is ready to lend a hand.

8463
CSO: 3105/155

UCD DEFECTORS UNCERTAIN ABOUT RELATIONS WITH PSOE

Madrid YA in Spanish 30 Mar 82 p 11

[Article by Francisco Muro de Iscar]

[Text] From now on Francisco Fernandez Ordóñez will have to show that he really has a functioning political party. The constitutional congress of the Democratic Action Party (which happens to be the same name that John Kennedy chose for the group that supported him in his 1960 campaign) closed on Sunday in Madrid amid the applause of nearly 600 delegates, but perhaps amid some dark clouds as well. For example, no prominent politician has joined the party, with the exception of the 16 deputies and senators who left the UCD [Democratic Center Union] along with Fernandez Ordóñez.

Although Democratic Action Party (PAD) sources attach no importance to this, the facts are otherwise. The party's hopes were dashed; for example, its honorary presidency, which it was hoping to fill until the last minute, ultimately remained vacant because none of these "big names" showed up. Moreover, there is already talk of a "critical faction" in the PAD that could be headed by Navarre Deputy Javier Moscoso, who had his eyes on the post of deputy secretary general, which eventually went to Luis González Seara. The former minister of universities was in charge of drafting the ideological position paper, which was one of the ones most hotly debated by the delegates as well as one of the most amended. Seara and Enrique Linde, an "in petto" candidate to head the PAD Secretariat, its "gray brain" and executive branch, will, along with Fernandez Ordóñez, be in charge in the party. Antonio de Santillana, Fermín Solana, Luis Berenguer and newsman Javier Martínez Reverte also seem destined to hold important posts in the new party.

Fernandez Ordóñez: A Desire for Change

The new PAD secretary general, Francisco Fernandez Ordóñez, closed the congress after his candidacy, the only one proposed, was approved by a vote of 447 in favor, against 79 blank, opposing or invalid ballots, which comes to almost 20 percent. This is significant, because Ordóñez had no opposition (in fact, no one could run against him) and because

the delegates had attended the congress more on the basis of a personal decision than as representatives of their provinces.

In his closing speech Fernandez Ordóñez asserted that "there can be no solution to the crisis that Spain is in without a strong desire for change." He then stressed this same point by stating that "the government must project a sense of renewal and change in Spanish life." Ordóñez defined the PAD as "a party with a Social Democratic ideology. We reject the use of the word Social Democracy to conceal rightwing politics." And in a bid to make the party's stand clear, he added that "we are not Socialists." With these remarks the PAD leader might have been trying to make people forget that there are Social Democrats in the UCD, in the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] and outside these two parties as well, Social Democrats who do not belong to the PAD.

Political Program

His harshest words were for the Right, "locked up in itself like a passive wall of resistance." He summarized the party's political program in the following four points:

--Rebuild the State. "Its services are not good, its intervention is stifling, and its finances are in crisis. We have an increasingly large but, perhaps, increasingly weak State."

--Reorganize government and reform state-run enterprise.

--Reassess economic programs. "All economic variables have to be reconciled with the goal of jobs. Based on true free market economy, we have to modify production structures through shared sacrifices and efforts."

--Review our educational, cultural and technological situation and broaden the scope of our freedom. After pointing out that freedom and ignorance are incompatible, he asserted that "castes must not be created during childhood, and we therefore oppose the principle of academic freedom as a means of protecting privileged situations or social distinctions and we are against furthering the notion of schooling as a method of perpetuating social inequality, through the financing law."

A Policy of Alliances: No to a Pact with Suárez, Morodo, Tamames...

After the close of the congress, which ended with the "Ode to Joy," Ordóñez asserted that "there is no chance of a PAD alliance with people like Suárez, Morodo or Ramón Tamames." Tamames had told a Valencia paper that in 6 or 8 weeks, in other words, after the elections in Andalusia, an electoral coalition consisting of Fernández Ordóñez, Suárez, Morodo, Alonso Puerta and himself might be formed. Ordóñez remarked that "the PAD holds talks and proposes alliances only with political parties that pursue a progressive approach," adding that

an agreement with the UCD was almost impossible. "If there were any progressives in the UCD," he said, "they would be with us." (For their part, Adolfo Suarez and Alonso Puerta yesterday denied that any sort of contacts were being made, although Puerta is in contact with Tamames about forming a Socialist Party that would be an alternative to the PSOE.)

The PAD secretary general also asserted that the party's deputies and senators "will continue supporting the UCD and the administration in parliamentary debate on national issues for reasons of democratic stability." He made it very clear, however, that this would apply "only to truly national issues, not necessarily to the ones that the administration unilaterally indicates." Ordonez pointed out in conclusion that "Spain's membership in NATO is an irreversible fact, and therefore we will not enter into discussions on the issue."

In any event, the congress is just the starting point of a political movement that not even the people involved have any real basis for evaluating. The PAD will not be running in the elections in Andalusia and might not back any specific party, though it may suggest voting for the PSOE. In addition, it has to set up its national leadership group and provincial "machines" in order to begin operations. Furthermore, it is going to need money, a great deal of money, if it really wants to play a serious role in Spanish politics. The source of this money could also condition its future role. It will start making decisions after the elections in Andalusia.

8743
CSO: 3110/110

POLL; HALF OF CENTER, LIBERAL VOTERS CHANGED PARTY IN 1979

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 14 Apr 82 p 6

[Article by Hans O. Alfredsson: "Swedish Institute for Opinion Polls: Every Other Center and Liberal Party Voter Has Changed Party"]

[Text] One-half of the voters in the Liberal Party and the Center Party have changed sympathies since the election in 1979. Almost one-third of the Liberal Party voters today support the Moderates. One-seventh of the Center Party voters have gone over to the Social Democrats.

This is revealed by an analysis which the Swedish Institute for Opinion Polls has made of the body of voters during the first quarter of this year.

The analysis starts with SVENSKA DAGBLADET/The Swedish Institute of Opinion Polls' voter barometer and is based on interviews with 3,126 persons in the ages 18--70 years and in the time 20 January--30 March. The interviews were carried out during visits in the homes.

Precisely one-half who before the election voted for the Center Party still believe that this party is best. Among the voters of the Liberal Party less than one-half, 46.8 percent, stick with their party.

The Social Democrats retain 93.4 percent of their voters, the Moderates 88.4 and the Left-Party Communists 59.8 percent.

From the Liberal Party to the Moderates

Of the Liberal Party voters 31 percent today stick to the Moderates, 10.2 percent stick to the Social Democrats and 3.8 percent stick to the Center Party. Eighteen percent of the Center voters in 1979 now prefer the Moderates, 14.1 percent prefer the Social Democrats, and 5.5 percent prefer the Liberal Party. 27.8 Percent of the Left-Party Communists today prefer the Social Democrats.

Among those who in the last election stuck with the Center Party, 3.3 percent now prefer the new Environmental Party. 2.6 Percent of the Left-Party Communist voters prefer the Environmental Party while the corresponding figures for the Liberal Party voters is 2.5 percent, among the Social Democrat voters 0.5 percent and among the Moderate voters 0.4 percent.

More Women for the Social Democrats

The voter barometers for the first quarter show that 29.8 percent of the men and 24.0 percent of the women believe that the Moderates are best. For the Social Democrats it is precisely opposite--this party attracts 47.4 percent of the men and 48.3 percent of the women. Among those who live in the countryside, 22.7 percent prefer the Center and 18 percent the Moderates. In the towns 8.8 percent prefer the Center and 28.1 percent the Moderates.

The Social Democrats and the Left-Party Communists have a stronger grasp on the younger, below 40 years old, than the older. For the nonsocialists, and especially, for the Center, it is precisely opposite.

10.8 Percent of the national trade union members believe that the Moderates are best. 71.4 Percent prefer the Social Democrats, 8.3 percent the Center, 4.1 percent the Liberal Party and 3.6 percent the Left-Party Communists. Among the members of the Central Organization of Salaried Employees National Government Civil Servants' Section 31.8 percent stick with the Moderates and 40.8 percent with the Social Democrats. Among the members of the Swedish Federation of Professional Employees 48.3 percent stick with the Moderates and 17.7 percent with the Social Democrats.

Public For Left-Party Communists

52.5 Percent of private employees believe that the Social Democrats are best. 26.6 Percent prefer the Moderates. Among the public employees 46.9 percent prefer the Social Democrats, 25.1 percent the Moderates, 9 percent the Liberal Party, 8.6 percent the Center Party and 6.9 percent the Left-Party Communists.

A good one-quarter, 26 percent, of those who today prefer the Liberal Party are uncertain whether they can imagine voting for the party in the next election. The will to vote is greater among the Center Party, 82.9 percent, and the Moderates, 88.4, but highest of all in the Left-Party Communists and the Social Democrats, 89.2 and 90.2 percent, respectively.

6.5 Percent Changing Blocks

An analysis of the party changes since 1979 shows that 4.5 percent of the voters wandered from the nonsocialists to the socialists, while 2.0 percent went the opposite way.

The Voters Own Movement

1 Part. valst 1979	2 m	3 fp	4 c	5 s	6 vpk	8 röst. ej
7 Ant. interv.	591	277	444	1155	162	459
2 m	88,4	31,0	18,5	1,6	2,1	18,5
3 fp	2,2	46,8	5,5	1,6	2,2	6,1
4 c	2,2	3,8	50,0	0,8	0	5,8
5 s	3,3	10,2	14,1	93,4	27,8	36,8
6 vpk	0,1	0	1,0	0,5	59,8	2,9
9 annat parti*	0,6	3,9	4,2	0,7	3,5	6,8
10 inget parti	3,2	4,3	6,7	1,3	4,7	23,0
11 *dorav miljopartiet	0,4	2,5	3,3	0,5	2,6	3,1

Key for table:

1. Party election 1979
2. Moderates
3. Liberal Party
4. Center Party
5. Social Democrats
6. Left-Party Communists
7. Number interviewed
8. Did not vote
9. Other party
10. No party
11. *Of which Environmental Party

This is how the body of voters has changed since the 1979 election. Read the table vertically starting from the party designations in the upper row.

Example: Of the Liberal Party's voters in 1979 31 percent now support the Moderates, 46.8 percent stick with the Liberal Party, 3.8 percent has gone to the Center, 10.2 to the Social Democrats and 2.5 percent to the Environmental Party.

8958
CSO: 3109/150

REPORT REVEALS MORE REASONS WHY MODERATES LEFT

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 21 Apr 82 p 8

[Article by Ake Ekdahl: "Moderates Call For Battle"]

[Text] After the tax battle, which torpedoed the old three-party government, a large number of other subjects of contention, which severely strain the nonsocialist coalition, are now being revealed. The moderates are pouring over Parliament a flood of demands for changes in the government's policy. Now it is not possible to conceal the old differences which could previously be shifted away in protection of the thick walls of the government office building.

The Center government promised the moderates in general features to follow their joint government declaration. This does not prevent significant differences of opinion from still occurring.

It involves big questions, such as the housing policy, the defense and the development aid, or small problems, such as the alcohol policy and the support for companies. After the general period for submitting motions, Gosta Bohman, moderate leader in Parliament, has called for battle on a dozen questions plus a series of so-called after-motions.

Individual moderates have gone against the government in up to 100 different areas just during the spring.

The heavy motions with Bohman's name relate to the airlines business, the economic policy, the defense policy, the regional policy, the research, the housing contributions, the sickness insurance, the data policy, the name law, government enterprises and the law on working hours, to mention the most basic.

The Government is Rejected

"This is not so strange," says the responsible official in the Moderates' Parliament office. "When we were part of the government we could affect the problems there and compromise."

But it is not a question about some small technical changes in the Moderates' demands for changes. On Tuesday the party left half a dozen proposals for

changes in the government's propositions. Most important is Gosta Bohman's motion about government institutions. There the Center government is considered to be almost incompetent.

The background is that the government institution group shows new large deficits from last year. The losses are up to 1400 million kronor. There are remarkably large losses in business enterprises, such as the forestry company Assi and the chemical company Berodox.

Bohman criticizes as follows:

"The administration of government institutions can be criticized for lack of energy. The same criticism must be directed against the state authorities. Two nonsocialist mandate periods will soon have expired without any minister of industry having been able to set to work with the problem of state institutions. No initiatives in spite of the fact that Parliament demanded it."

Bohman does not want the Center government to add 300 fresh millions of kronor. He said he wants to reorganize, sell out companies, get some in on the stock market, issue new guidelines for state institutions and appoint a special crisis group with experts and politicians in order to get order in the business.

"Now it must be enough!" is how it is stated briefly in the introduction to a press report from the Moderates.

Law on Working Hours

Bohman also hits the government's proposal about a new law for working hours. The government wants to change the overtime rules and have new regulations which limit extra time and make the consequences more serious for employers who do not follow the rules.

"This here is against all reason. It cannot be advisable to reduce the working hours in these days. The government should instead assume responsibility and achieve better utilization of the working hours," Bohman shouts.

He believes that the government's proposal leads to lower productivity, increased withdrawal from unemployment compensation and gives lower tax income for the government.

No and No Again

The Center government receives moderate protests in a series of other problems too. Carl Bildt says no to the proposal for giving Telub in Vaxjo 57 million kronor to cover parts of the costs from the Libya affair, Joakim Ollen wants to reject the new rules for sales tax for import, Erik Hovhammar says no to the rough handling of the forest owners by the Forest Care Administration. He also rejects Industry Minister Asling's proposal for adding an additional 25 risk millions for the experiments with the Stirling engine.

Gosta Bohman refuses when the government wants to increase the number of representatives in the market court and strengthen the ombudsman for economic freedom. He sees it as a proposal for introducing control of mergers. He does not want tax on cassette tapes either. This would involve a price increase without comparison and lead to illegal imports, he believes.

8958
CSO: 3109/150

'EXILED' DISK REPRESENTATIVE YUCEL TOP INTERVIEWED

Rome AVANTI in Italian 8 Apr 82 p 7

[Interview with Trade Union Representative Yucel Top: "Turkey Has Lived Under the Control of the Generals for 2 1/2 Years"]

[Text] From 12 September 1980, when the military headed by General Evren seized power, to date, there has been a slow but gradual process in Turkey that has tended to eliminate any form of democratic freedom describing the political opposition and the trade unions as criminals.

As of today, 50,000 persons are imprisoned, of whom 2,000 are trade union members. According to Amnesty International 70 persons have died by torture, while according to regime sources that number was 15. Furthermore, a trial is now being held against 52 leaders and trade union men, including the president and secretary general of DISK--the foremost Turkish trade union. It began in Istanbul on 24 December 1980. The prosecution asked that they be sentenced to capital punishment.

The news agency ADNKRONOS interviewed the representative of the Turkish trade union DISK in exile, Yucel Top, a guest in Rome of the CGIL, CISL, UIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor, Italian Confederation of Labor Unions, Italian Union of Labor] Federation on the situation in Turkey and particularly on the trade union situation.

[Question] What were the main events that led to the present situation?

[Answer] When the military seized power, the National Security Council made two statements: In the first it affirmed that in order to restore democracy it was necessary to suspend parliament and prohibit all trade union activity; the second asked all leaders of DISK to surrender to the police. Later, all the freely elected representatives were removed and replaced by persons tied to the military regime. But the military's most serious move was the changing of laws on preventive imprisonment which, following the coup, was extended to 30 days, and later to 90. Furthermore a regulation says that in certain cases it can be extended indefinitely for 20 days at a time.

[Question] What are the living conditions of the working class in Turkey now?

[Answer] Turkey suffers an inflation of 150 percent. Before the coup, the minimum wage of a skilled worker was 5,000 Turkish lira (50,000 Italian lire).

Following the coup the minimum wage was raised to 10,000 Turkish lira but because of an increase in withholding, the real increase was only 1,000 Turkish lira. If it is considered that a kilo of meat costs 500 Turkish lira, and a pair of shoes at least 2,000 Turkish lira, it is clear that a worker can buy only 3 pairs of shoes with his wage.

Before the coup it was difficult to hold the ruling class to the collective contracts; now the situation has worsened. The other trade union, the TURK-IS was not suspended, but it has no possibility of freely carrying on its activities. The relations between the bosses and the laborers have been determined by the Supreme Council for arbitration, which is composed of 9 persons (2 TURK-IS representatives, 2 management representatives, and 5 government officials).

[Question] The military seized power affirming that its first objective was the fight against terrorism; do you believe the phenomenon is an internal Turkish matter or that there are international ties?

[Answer] In a nation with 4 million unemployed, with an economy in tatters, with such strong contradictions, politically motivated personal attacks should not cause surprise. The coup itself should be considered as a result of the economic situation. The rightist and conservative press maintained that there was a destabilizing situation maneuvered by groups abroad, but we think DISK is a domestic phenomenon. The unemployed did not become so because of international terrorism but because of the economic situation.

[Question] What support does the military regime have?

[Answer] The junta has an economic mandate given by the ruling class to apply its plan. But, profiting by the situation created, it obtained a consensus that was as broad as it was contrived. There is much discontent, but this cannot become an opposition unless it is organized.

[Question] What is the position of the farmers?

[Answer] The economic plan is also negative for farmers because financial guarantees were abolished in order to use the sources for the purposes of big capital.

[Question] How does the trade union plan to organize itself in this situation?

[Answer] It is difficult to say because the repression is in a period of growth. All the DISK leaders are in prison or under surveillance, or they have fled abroad.

[Question] Why was the trade union so severely damaged by the repression?

[Answer] The attack against DISK is an attack against democracy. The bill of indictment in the trial against the 52 leaders includes trade union documents against fascism and for democracy. It is a trial against all democratic freedoms which DISK supported. There has been an attempt to criminalize democracy, there is no hunt for the guilty. Therefore, the trade union is damaged since it is a democratic institution that is antithetical to the plans of the junta and of the economic forces that support it.

COMMAND STAFF GENERAL DESCRIBES WAR SCENARIO FOR FINLAND

Helsinki SUOMEN KUVALEHTI in Finnish 2 Apr 82 pp 14-18

[Interview with Lieutenant General Pentti Vayrynen by Antti Blafield, date and place not specified]

[Text] The objective of the General Staff is to make preparations for the greatest possible national disaster, war. Thus the General Staff has also outlined a picture of what a possible war would be like.

According to Lieutenant General Pentti Vayrynen, the General Staff's military economics director, the "equipment general", a war in Finland would be part of a larger war. It would entail tank movements deep into Finnish territory, paratroop descents behind our own lines, amphibious landings, and air assaults.

[Question] What is the type of war for which Finland's defense forces should make preparations? Will it include the use of tactical nuclear weapons against Finland on Finnish territory?

[Answer] An armed attack on Finland can be connected with the procurement of a strategic advantage against the other party in an armed conflict between the large military alliances or in preparations for such an armed conflict. An attack directed against our country would apparently have limited goals or it would thus be an attempt to take advantage of Finnish territory. The most threatened areas are Lapland and the area of the Baltic Sea.

A situation in which relations between the parties concerned become gradually aggravated to the point of open warfare would be more probable than a sudden outbreak of war. A completely surprise attack on Finland in such a way that we would have no warning of its possibility does not seem to be probable.

We assume that an attack on our territory would occur with conventional weapons. For many reasons we consider that Finland itself is not a target for nuclear weapons. Instead, it is assumed that the effects of nuclear weapons will, however, extend to Finland in the form of fall-out from nuclear explosions elsewhere, misdirected missiles, or missiles that are intercepted and exploded over our territory.

The picture of war will, of course, include military flights over our territory as well as accidents in our territorial waters even before a possible attack.

[Question] The first and second world wars differed considerably from one another. When World War II began, it was a shock for many countries since preparations had been made for the same type of war as World War I. In what way do officials in Finland's defense forces consider that a possible major war will differ from World War II?

[Answer] The outbreak of World War II was a shock for several countries. This could have resulted from the fact that the party starting the war had in a very short time and quite secretly been able to create and develop a new type of army, which was quite mobile. Even if this had been observed in advance, there was no time to develop such qualitative and quantitative counter-weapons and strategic procedures so that this shock could have been avoided.

The end of World War II provided hints of the nature of the next possible major war: the forceful concentration of firepower, large landings, and the use of nuclear weapons, among other things. The more time that passes, the more varied the weapons and methods by which in principle the same goals can be achieved. However, new developments are being discussed ever more openly and the possible measures of an opponent have also been made public so that the nature and alternatives of a possible major war can be weighed perhaps more realistically than before World War II.

The most significant factors are the development of missiles, their possible use in the initial stage of a war as well as the possible use of nuclear weapons in connection with them. The development of nuclear weapons also as a tactical weapon of the battle front as well as their inclusion in the weaponry of aircraft have made possible the tremendous augmentation of firepower.

Increased firepower has been pursued and also achieved by increasing the number of conventional weapons, by diversifying them, by increasing their range, and by improving their accuracy with various electronic and electro-optical means such as lasers.

Reconnaissance procedures from satellites to various surveillance installations and detecting devices or sensors have made it possible to increase the amount, quality, and accuracy of data and to make quicker utilization of it.

The increase in the number of helicopters in the most varied tasks means much to the mobility of an army. Also the mobility of troops and weapons on the ground has been improved.

What is peculiar to all these traits is that their development has been directed by worldwide interests and they have been planned for the conditions of an aggressor, which are not at all Finnish.

This tremendous development of offensive weapons has also created the need to develop counter-weapons and measures. Thus significant resources have in recent times been sacrificed for the development of defensive weapons and the results are becoming apparent. Anti-air and anti-tank systems, in particular, have been developed. Also the accuracy and speed of other weapons have been increased so that they are even completely automated.

What Was The Lesson of Vietnam?

[Question] How have the limited wars since World War II affected the picture of a future war, for example, the Vietnam war?

[Answer] All the wars after World War II have been waged outside of Europe. It is doubtful that they have had much effect on the concept of the type of possible war we will have on Finnish soil. For example, the Vietnam war was a guerilla war, in which the goal of the aggressor was not to take over the country. In part, they support that picture of a war which we have.

These wars have been waged with conventional weapons and methods. The nuclear threshold has not been crossed and the wars have remained limited. What is also essential is that even a small country is through perseverance able to defend itself for a long time without being crushed.

The wars in the Near East have provided examples of short, forceful attacks, which achieve their purpose in a relatively short time. They demonstrate that the state of defense readiness should be as high as possible, it cannot be created after an attack has commenced. It must exist in advance.

[Question] What would be a probable theatre of war? Will it be along the borders or deep within Finnish territory? Will it be extensive or limited to concentrated "wedges"?

[Answer] An aggressor will try to make the timing and place of an attack a surprise. However much we may be prepared, the timing of an attack can still be a surprise.

An aggressor will also try to accomplish the objective of an attack as quickly as possible. Naturally, the territorial extent of an attack depends on this goal. In any event it is clear that an attack will include forceful landings and thus also ground operations. An attack will also include infantry invasions if the attack is directed toward Southwest Finland. Ground operations will consist of forceful wedges for so-called "corridors of passage", using as many corridors as possible. Also there will be considerable air activity.

We are capable of beginning our defense from the borders. Our defense is based on the principle of so-called area defense. This means that an enemy will be continuously worn down from all sides and thus its attack will be arrested. We may end up fighting deep within Finnish territory. However, the goal is to prevent the enemy from reaching areas that are vital from the point of view of the country's operations and defense as well as to prevent the use of Finnish territory for an attack against another country. Also we must be able to prevent overflights occurring high in the atmosphere.

The area defense system and the local defense that is part of it do not comprise guerilla warfare. Guerilla warfare is a struggle against the usurper of an occupied country.

What Weapons Will Be Used?

[Question] What are the most probable chief forces that will be used against Finland?

[Answer] The seizing of a part of Finland or the whole nation presupposes exceptionally strong ground forces. The aggressor will be forced to use troops equipped and trained for conditions other than those existing in Finland. They will be motorized to a high degree and the vehicles will be armored. It is also possible that the aggressor will have a considerable number of actual armored combat tanks. The mobility of motorized troops will, however, encounter extraordinary difficulties on Finland's terrain and under its climatic conditions.

Such highly motorized infantry troops will be supported by heavy firepower from the army as well as by air attacks. The use of helicopters, landings made by them, among other things, are a part of the operations of such troops.

An attempt will be made to transport heavily motorized infantry troops, which will have with them the necessary fire support, into the country by means of amphibious landing vessels along the coast. Even large numbers of troops can be placed behind our own lines by means of air transport.

A significant portion of the equipment of all armies is relatively old and obsolete. No army is capable of keeping its combat equipment at the level made possible by modern technology. Neither time nor economic resources are sufficient for this. Only a part of this combat equipment is always of the highest level and this portion is reserved for the aggressor's chief opponent. For this reason older defensive weapons also have an effect on the equipment of an aggressor, on the so-called hard targets.

Also troops that have invaded deep into a territory must be continuously supplied and maintained so that they can continue the struggle. This presupposes replenishments of fuel and ammunition. The supply of fuel especially is easily disrupted.

How Is An Enemy Repelled?

[Question] What kind of defensive weapons should Finland have in order to provide the best defense against an aggressor? Are we capable of repelling nuclear weapons?

[Answer] In the development and procurement of combat weapons we proceed from the fact that the aggressor is equipped with modern combat weapons. Concisely stated a defense struggle is a combined effect of fire and movement. It consists of the most varied operations and opportunities to exert an influence. We need all kinds of weapons.

We need the ability to repel armored tanks all the way from beyond their range of fire to close-range combat. This question has not been resolved anywhere with just one type of weapon.

The repelling of an enemy presupposes an effective anti-aircraft system, which should protect vital areas and objectives as well as troops. This has also not been resolved with just one type of weapon.

We should be able to repel landings by the joint effect of coastal artillery, the navy, and the air force.

We also need exceptionally quick and accurate guidance systems, which include, among other things, communications, reconnaissance, and surveillance equipment. They should be so up-to-date that jamming and disruption attempts on the part of the enemy can be prevented.

Troops and weapons should have better mobility than they have now and they should also be able to operate in the dark.

In addition to Finland's terrain and weather conditions, which we will always attempt to use to our advantage in all situations, our power resources have a decisive effect on the quality and number of weapons.

In principle, an aircraft bearing nuclear weapons is repelled with anti-aircraft weapons in exactly the same manner as any other conventional combat aircraft. The same also applies to low-flying so-called aerodynamic missiles inasmuch as such missiles are observed in time. We do not have any other means of repelling nuclear weapons.

[Question] What are Finland's weakest points in its defensive armament?

[Answer] We have both qualitative as well as quantitative deficiencies. We are lacking anti-tank weapons intended to repel modern armored combat tanks. The most essential of these is the anti-tank missile. Also there are too few anti-aircraft weapons even though we have entered the missile era.

Our field artillery is to a significant degree obsolete and its ability to perform is insufficient. Even before we can think about guided projectiles, for example, we must have the weaponry by which they can be fired. Our field artillery is also lacking electronic equipment for meeting present-day demands.

A means of troop transport comparable to a farm tractor is not sufficient as a vehicle suitable for combat, but it does indeed replace the horse, which we no longer have. We are in serious need of transport vehicles, of which a significant portion should be armored.

The operational capacity of the army to function in the dark is weak compared to an aggressor equipped with modern equipment for night operations. We are completely lacking in these types of equipment.

The fact that we have fallen behind in our need for combat readiness is above all a result of a shortage of economic resources. These shortages are also the basis for allocation proposals. There has not even been a discussion in the defense forces of some kind of a model state which would serve as a basis for determining allocations. Indeed, the level of our allocations has been compared to the impression obtained elsewhere with respect to how low it really is.

What Sense Is There in Armored Tanks?

[Question] Under what conditions does Finland need heavy armaments such as tanks? How many should there be before they have any significance?

[Answer] A successful defense presupposes an ability to use all types of combat weapons: defense, delay, and attack. Tank units that have made deep incursions into the country must be continuously worn down so that they can finally be stopped and turned back. Troop units that have made landings must be destroyed before they can make contact with troop units that have penetrated the interior and vital areas must be protected. This presupposes an ability to concentrate troops quickly and also an ability to attack.

The achievement of these goals is not possible without armored combat tanks and armored vehicles as well as heavy weapons and an anti-aircraft system to provide protection for them. A quantitative need is difficult to propose. We have tried to achieve a situation in which each type of weapon is in a correct ratio with respect to the tasks that have to be accomplished. Our economic resources already preclude an overabundance. What is essential is that the weapons be as effective as possible and that they be provided with sufficient ammunition.

[Question] Does the military obligation of the YYA [Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid] Agreement cause an additional burden for Finland's defense forces which they would not have if this agreement did not exist?

[Answer] The YYA Agreement is in complete harmony with our own defense needs and our national goals. In accordance with the agreement Finland's obligation as an independent state is to prevent an attack and to concentrate all its forces on the defense of its territorial inviolability within its borders. This has also been recently confirmed by the Third Parliamentary Defense Committee. How we accomplish this is for ourselves to determine. The agreement does not contain any additional burdens. Also the agreement, for its part, raises the threshold which an aggressor must cross.

10576
CSO: 3107/105

MILITARY

FINLAND

FINNISH AIR FORCE TO BUY THREE FOKKER TRANSPORTS

PM101547 Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 7 May 82 p 6

[Unattributed report: "Air Force to Buy Three Fokker Aircraft"]

[Text] On Thursday [6 May] the cabinet authorized the air force to buy three Fokker transport aircraft. The purchase will cost around 40 million markkaa and will also include spare parts and special equipment as well as the aircraft themselves.

The new Fokker aircraft will replace some of the armed forces' outdated DC 3's. The aircraft will be used for the transport of troops and of heavy equipment.

The air force will buy two Fokker aircraft from Karair Oy--aircraft which have already been leased to the air force. The third transport aircraft will be supplied by Fokker B.V. in the Netherlands.

Before its decision to buy the Fokker aircraft the government also looked at studies of the suitability of other types of aircraft. It is reported that the Fokker aircraft were compared with a Canadian and a Soviet aircraft.

The armed forces justify the choice of the Fokker aircraft with the good experience of the aircraft leased from Karair. The aircraft have proved to be particularly suited to the tasks required of them, a Defense Ministry spokesman said.

According to the Defense Ministry another important consideration is that Karair has built up a service organization for the aircraft model and that Finnair has a flight simulator which is admirably suited to the Fokker aircraft.

CSO: 3109/156

MILITARY

NORWAY

GOVERNMENT PLANS TO EXPAND LORAN C NAVIGATION SYSTEM

PM101007 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 5 May 82 p 4

[Report by Knut Falchenberg: "Government Proposes Civilian Loran C Station on Spitsbergen"]

[Text] The government has decided to propose further expansion of the Loran C navigation system. One of the new stations will be situated on Spitsbergen and another will be built in East Finnmark. Whereas the present stations are run by the armed forces, the civilian telecommunications administration will be responsible for the running of the new stations, sources in the Transport and Communications Ministry have informed AFTENPOSTEN.

It is a difficult foreign policy problem which is now finally being resolved. The question of the further expansion of Loran C has stood more or less still since the so-called localization committee produced its report in 1977. A number of technical problems have been under discussion in the last 5 years, but the most difficult problems have involved foreign policy considerations. These have centered on Spitsbergen's special position, and on Norway's relations with the Soviet Union.

The Transport and Communications Ministry is at present putting the final touches to a draft bill for the Storting. This will be sent to various ministries for their views, including the foreign and defense ministries and ministries dealing with environmental, oil and fisheries questions. However, there have already been such wide-ranging advance contacts between these ministries that agreement has already been reached on all central sections of the draft bill. The only remaining problem is one of finance. If the Finance Ministry succeeds in making room for the project in the budget, the intention is to propose the construction of five or six new stations, beginning in 1983. The system would become operational piece by piece, with full operation in 1986.

In the past there has been some controversy about which state body should run the stations. The existing Loran C stations in Vesterålen and on Jan Mayen are run under military supervision, by the armed forces joint signals corps. It is difficult to imagine the latter station run by any other body. On the other hand a number of objections to the idea of an army-run station on Spitsbergen have been raised. It has been difficult enough to reach a

decision on a civilian-run Loran C station on Spitsbergen. It has been proposed that such a station should be run by the telecommunications administration and be situated on Bjornoya, which is also included in the Spitsbergen treaty's ban on naval bases, fortresses and the use of the area covered by the treaty during wartime. The telecommunications administration will also be responsible for the other new stations. It is clear that one will be in East Finnmark close to Norway's eastern border. However, the telecommunications administration will not take over the running of the two existing stations. The armed forces will retain responsibility of these, according to the plan agreed at present.

Sources in the Transport and Communications Ministry told AFTENPOSTEN that his intention is to present the draft bill to the Storting during the spring session, even though it is uncertain whether the matter can be settled before the recess. It is almost a year since the previous government raised the matter in its security committee, but no decision was reached at that time.

The expansion of the navigation system will be of great importance for people using the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea. It will affect oil prospecting activities in the north, fishermen, ordinary ship traffic and the coast guard, for example. A question raised in past public debate of the Loran C system is the extent to which Norwegian or foreign naval vessels could make use of the system for precise position determination. It is clear that any and every navy buying receiver equipment could make use of Loran C, but no navy would be dependent on the navigational data from the relatively vulnerable stations. There are also other systems for military use.

C30: 3108/99

PAPER QUESTIONS EXONERATION OF DEFENSE MINISTER IN SUB CASE

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 16 Apr 82 p 2

[Article: "The Defense Minister"]

Text It is a known saying that it is not news if a dog bites a man but it is news if a man bites a dog. With the same measure it should not be news if the constitutional committee during its investigation of the cabinet minister's work did not direct its criticism against Defense Minister Torsten Gustafsson's behavior in connection with the submarine affair last fall, but instead probably big news if it refrained from doing this.

In the morning echo on Wednesday it was also reported that a majority of the representatives of the constitutional committee--Moderates and Social Democrats --should be prepared, as it was called, to censure Gustafsson. Later on we will return to the amazing formulation that the government should get approval of its handling of the submarine affair with one exception, Gustafsson.

Let us start with remind you about the strong criticism which from several directions was directed against Gustafsson because he remained in Norway in the initial stage of the incident, because he thereafter quite calmly went home to Gotland and for his quite famous statement that force was excluded. SVENSKA DAGBLADET joined in the opinion that Gustafsson himself would reasonably have to admit his mistakes and resign.

It is possible, not to say credible, that Gustafsson's departure at that point in time could have been forced through a vote of no confidence in him in Parliament. However, anything like this was not brought up. Presumably it was not considered reasonable in view of the prevailing crisis situation. Gustafsson himself did not for one moment get the idea of making his position available.

All this presumably has to do with the smoothing-over attitude to parliamentary responsibility which we have in Sweden. In these days we have, as is well known, an example of an entirely different attitude, in the home country of parliamentarism, Great Britain. In the middle of the Falkland crisis the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lord Carrington, has taken the consequences of the criticism and resigned. The Minister of Defense submitted his application for resignation but without getting it approved.

Here at home time has passed, and the work on the approval of the cabinet meeting minutes by the Constitutional Committee starts to approach its end. There is no grounds for anticipating the position taken in any other way than to say that it would have been amazing if Gustafsson went free from criticism. However, all indications are that this will not be the case.

Let us then return to the famous formulation that the government's way of handling the submarine affair should be approved with one exception, the defense minister. If, as can be assumed, strong criticism will be directed against the defense minister, this can obviously never fail to affect the government as a whole. The prime minister is for natural reasons responsible for the cabinet minister he has brought into his government. In this case, Foreign Minister Ola Ullsten is co-responsible.

This should quite specially be the case if Moderates and Social Democrats strongly criticize the defense minister while Liberals and Center Party members in the Constitutional Committee prefer to keep quiet. It can in that case be understood as if Gustafsson alone is not responsible and one therefore wants to free him to avoid having to name others.

The only reasonable thing would naturally have been if Gustafsson himself had resigned already after the submarine affair or if the prime minister otherwise had dismissed him. Otherwise the vote of no confidence should have been brought up. Now the investigation by the Constitutional Committee is like throwing yeast into the oven after the dough.

Still the parliamentary responsibility remains. The mills of the Constitutional Committee certainly grind slowly--but they do grind.

8958
CSO: 3109/150

GERMAN FIRM PROPOSES 2-STAGE REUSABLE SATELLITE LAUNCHER

Duesseldorf VDI NACHRICHTEN in German 5 Mar 82 p 4

[Article by Horst Rademacher: "The 'Ariane X-1' Will Be Reusable"]

[Text] At enormous expense, the United States has developed an economical reusable space system, the Space Shuttle. In the Soviet Union, in Western Europe, Japan and China, the idea of reusing space transport vehicles comes up only gingerly. Recently, during a symposium at the French Space Research Center (CNES) in Paris, West German scientists from university and industry propagated for Europe the step away from the disposable rocket with concepts of their own.

In the future, economy will play the most important role in the realization of larger space plans. For these occasions, economically operating transport vehicles allowing for a larger payload must be available, even for geostationary orbits.

This means that new booster rockets must be developed in order to satisfy future demands. But the engineer Dr Dietrich E. Koelle, head of Space Systems at Messerschmidt-Boelkow-Blohm (MBB) in Ottobrunn, states: "The development of a new booster rocket takes more than a decade at best." Therefore, if today the go-ahead were given for new projects, they could be used at the very earliest in 1995--perhaps at just the right time when the scintillating desk drawer plans for the utilization of space are to be realized.

Against this backdrop, the CNES recently extended invitations to Paris, in order to discuss the course of European space travel into the next millenium. Suggestions made by MBB, as well as by the University of Stuttgart, go far beyond any projects imagined until now by leading French scientists, which could even get the better of them: in Ottobrunn, MBB worked up a study for the Ariane X-1, a large two-stage space capsule with a reusable first stage segment. The present CNES concept for Ariane 5 had been based on a three-stage device which was not reusable. MBB wishes to eliminate the third stage because the two stages of Ariane X-1 are to be powered by engines which burn fluid hydrogen and fluid oxygen. The energy won by this redox reaction is considerably higher than that won through the oxidation of UDMH fuel with nitrogen tetroxide, the fuel for the initial stages of the Ariane 5. Only the third stage was to be fuelled with hydrogen and oxygen in the French conception.

A typical trajectory for Ariane X-1 in a transfer orbit for geostationary orbits could look like this: at launching, the 44-ton rocket lifts off, propelled by the 9 HM-60 engines of the first stage. After 215 seconds, at a height of 90 km, one of the HM-60 second stage engines start up. Its propulsion lifts the payload in 250 seconds to an altitude of 200 km.

Meanwhile, the first-stage segment returns to earth on a ballistic path. A thermal shield helps discharge heat produced by friction. According to MBB's Dr Koelle, eight of the nine engines of this stage are attached concentrically at the outer rim, one of them in the center. With the propulsion of this central engine, the first-stage segment could be slowed down to "zero" on the descent, i.e. it could land softly. Recovery teams would have to search for the device approximately 1,500 km from the launching site.

According to the MBB study, launching costs would be exactly half those of traditional concepts. With a single use rocket, such as Ariane 5, it would cost approximately 14 million European accounting units (one unit = DM 2.50), in order to put a one-ton payload into geostationary orbit. With the semireusable Ariane X-1, it would amount to 7 million units. And, according to Koelle, launching costs would be lowered even further if both stages were made reusable.

Not only the launching costs determine the price of satellite missions. The spaceships themselves could be made reusable, for these actual workhorses in outer space are extremely expensive. NASA made a start with the Solar-Maximum satellite; ERNO, in Bremen, delivered Spacelab; and next year MBB's Spas 01 may possibly fly--all of them reusable spaceships.

In order to be able to rouse these satellites, they must first be retrieved from space. MBB is therefore thinking of a booster rocket with a reusable second stage as an alternative to Ariane X-1. It could attach itself automatically to the satellite to be recovered in the lower stratosphere, could then enter a descending trajectory and likewise land with "reversible propulsion."

A device by the name of "Istra" which has been developed by Prof Rolf Buehler and Engineer Peter Kramer from the Institute for Space Travel at the University of Stuttgart is likely to have similar capabilities. In this rocket, fuel from an oxidator flying along in a separate tank is being oxidized. The energy released in this chemical reaction is transformed into kinetic energy and thus propels the rocket according to the recoil principle. Propulsion is gained strictly through the energy won from the chemical reaction.

The Buehler and Kramer group is still in the first phase of feasibility studies, but their idea has meanwhile gained so much recognition internationally that the future looks rosy to them. And yet, the ram jet engine principle is in no way new. It is used today primarily in military missiles (e.g. the cruise missiles). Meanwhile, there are already engines which still functioned perfectly at 6 Mach during testing.

Prof Buehler did admit once that it is a bit unusual for "rocket people" to operate with ram jet engines. "Since the V-2, rockets have gotten along without air," he said. If at all, the ram jet engine came under consideration only for horizontally starting aircraft. The pioneering achievement of the Stuttgart rockets lies in the combination between rocket, vertical launching and the--purely analytical--proof of a high degree of effectiveness.

9328

CSO: 3103/409

PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN WORKERS SEEN INTENSIFYING

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 4/5 Apr 82 p 5

[Text] In enumerating reasons for the heavy vote losses by the Social Democrats in the most recent Landtag elections in Lower Saxony, party chairman Willy Brandt referred, among other things, also to the foreigner question which is coming to a head primarily as a "Turkish question." For the first time this problem had a bad impact on the SPD in Lower Saxony. Brandt said that among the German public the impression is spreading "that we have taken too long in solving the problem of those seeking asylum and in limiting the further immigration of foreigners." However, the SPD must also have the "courage to be unpopular" in this question. It must not support unworthy tendencies which are also unjust to foreign fellow citizens.

Reminders of Schwarzenbach

With these brief comments Brandt has put his finger on an extremely delicate problem which is increasingly giving trouble not only to his party, but to all responsible forces in the FRG. Numerous indexes confirm that--parallel with the intensification of economic difficulties and the rise in unemployment--increased displeasure about the many foreigners and the resultant difficulties in living together has developed among the people. The general mood and many incidents not infrequently bring to mind the heated debates in Switzerland about the Schwarzenbach initiative during the late 1960's and the beginning of the 1970's. Many observers have no doubt that a majority of the FRG's citizens would speak out in favor of a drastic reduction in the number of foreigners if there could be a vote on it today. But as always, the pressure from below for tangible and convincing solutions is incontestably intensifying, and it is primarily directed against the Federal Government and the parties supporting it. The SPD, whose traditional following in the congested industrial regions is most directly affected by the practical difficulties of the influx of foreigners, is now coming to feel this pressure especially strongly.

At present about 4.6 million foreigners live in the FRG, accounting for about 7.5 percent of the total population. In absolute terms this is indeed the largest number of foreigners among all the countries in Western Europe, but on a percentage basis its share is just half the level in Switzerland, which has meanwhile become rather stable. If in the FRG the foreigner problem has

nonetheless reached an acute stimulus threshold, this is not at all because the citizens here would react more touchily or less tolerantly toward foreigners than elsewhere. Compared, for example, to the conditions in Switzerland there are primarily three important factors which have decisively aggravated the foreigner question in the FRG in recent times.

Social Tensions

First, the current peak level of foreigners in the FRG coincides exactly with a marked economic recessionary phase. Just under 2 million unemployed are confronted by about 2 million employed foreigners (here they are euphemistically called "guest workers"). Among the foreigners themselves the number of unemployed is higher than the average. (Different than in Switzerland, at least the residence permit cannot be taken away from citizens from the EC area if they do not have a job.) Can it be a surprise if against the background of increased economic fear for one's existence, an intensifying competitive struggle for jobs and public funds which are getting scarcer, the social tensions about the foreigner question become substantially more virulent, if radical remedies and demagogic slogans find more favorable fertile soil than in times of undisturbed growth in prosperity?

The "Turkish Question"

In addition, secondly, there is the specific Turkish problem. Some 1.5 million or about one-third of all foreigners living in the FRG come from Turkey. Their proportion in the total population has grown the fastest by far in the last few years, less because of a direct increase in the labor force--officially since the mid-1970's there has been a freeze on recruiting--rather because of an overflowing arrival of families in respect to which, since the Federal Government introduced the requirement for Turkish citizens to have a visa, things do not always go so properly. According to the statistics, only about one-third of the 1.5 million Turks in the FRG have a registered job. The number of illegal workers is estimated to be quite significant.

Yet the main problem lies in the integration difficulties which in the case of the Turks, in contrast to other groups of foreigners, are especially difficult. Different from, say, the Italians or Spaniards, they come from a culture which has little in common with modern central-European realities, they are without exception Muslims, rooted in foreign traditions and values. Efforts toward social integration of the Turks so far show rather depressing results. On the one hand, there is the complaint that the newcomers from Anatolia--at least in the first generation--show hardly any interest in social adaptation, but rather isolate themselves in their private lives as in a ghetto. Efforts by the German authorities for as broad integration as possible, moreover, even in Turkey itself, seem rather to encounter mistrust and have been criticized there as "compulsory Germanization." On the other hand, it is at least understandable and hardly proof of basic hostility toward foreigners if native parents are opposed to school classes with over 50 percent Turkish children who for the most part have only a rudimentary knowledge of German. The view, not infrequently heard, that the foreigner problem in the FRG is

is being reduced to the "Turkish question," may indeed be oversimplifying things too much but undoubtedly there is some truth in this concise formulation.

Abused Right to Asylum

The third factor, then, which has contributed a great deal to the intensified emotionalizing of the foreigner problem has to do with the special complex area of people seeking asylum. Compared with other countries, in the FRG there is a very liberal practice in respect to the right of asylum. Accordingly, every applicant for political asylum has the thus far unlimited right to stay in the country for as long as it takes for a decision to be reached on his application. The examination procedures, with various appeal possibilities, however, until recently took several years as a rule. In the meantime, the applicant lives largely at the expense of German social insurance.

The possibility as an applicant for asylum to avoid German entry restrictions at least for a certain period of time became known especially in Turkey and various Third World countries at the end of the 1970's. The number of people seeking asylum swelled and in 1980 reached the record level of 108,000 applications. Everyone realizes that with the large majority of these people it is not a question of political refugees in the narrower sense, but rather first and foremost one of so-called economic refugees. Even if after completing the lengthy checking procedures only a small portion of those seeking asylum actually is recognized as politically persecuted, it is still obvious that not infrequently purposeful abuse is carried on with the liberal German processing rules.

Following the introduction of a work prohibition for people seeking asylum and an accelerated examination procedure the rush in 1981 did in fact decline by about one-half compared to the previous year, and further restrictive regulations are to be adopted soon. Nonetheless, the question of asylum seekers continues to be a negative irritating word in the current debate on foreigners, even if the approximately 160,000 people seeking asylum among the 4.6 million non-Germans in the country are numerically hardly significant, and confusing this question with that of the guest worker problem is objectively justified only in a very limited way.

Recommendations for Stabilization

In the meantime most politicians are basically in agreement that a substantially more energetic effort than has been the case so far must be made for stabilization, if possible even a certain reduction in the number of foreigners in the FRG. A further influx would not only explosively aggravate the latent defense reflexes among the people, above all else it would also render completely illusory the goal, which can be realized only over a long time anyway, of improving integration of the contingents of foreigners already present. Suggestions for more effective limitation and a policy of consolidation are already being discussed and are currently being quite vigorously proposed even by SPD politicians such as Minister President Boerner of Hesse--who this fall faces a tough ballot.

There does appear to be unanimity about the idea that the FRG is not remotely in a position to grant Turkey complete freedom of movement in respect to immigration, to which it would basically have a claim starting in 1986 after the association agreement with the EC takes effect. There is also discussion of the possibility of material incentives to stimulate the willingness on the part of foreign workers to go home, for example in the form of early payout of their social insurance contributions. The CDU/CSU is demanding a rigorous limitation on the arrival of families. In the case of children of guest workers the residence permit is only to be granted if they arrive in the FRG before they are of school age.

In a Dilemma

In spite of the obviously sharpened awareness of the problem and in spite of individual efforts for solutions the Federal Government at present has not been able to awaken in the public the impression that it has a clear and consistent plan for effective stabilization of the foreigner question. But even if this impression were not right or at least the measures now being debated were systematically pushed forward, it is still questionable whether the negative atmosphere for the government parties can be corrected so quickly. Visible successes in stabilization and integration cannot be achieved over night in this very difficult area--in fact, all the less so as the FRG, as an EC member, long since has not been readily able to regulate the influx of foreigners at its own discretion. But such differentiations could be conveyed in a campaign only with difficulty. Unless a noticeable economic upswing favors some lessening of the problem, there is much to support the idea that Brandt's analysis of the negative effects of the foreigner question on the coalition parties in Bonn in the Lower Saxony election will also be true of the upcoming trips to the ballot boxes.

12124
CSO: 3103/395

PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL BORDER SERVICE NOTED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 22 Apr 82 p 4

[Article by Claus-Einar Langen: "Federal Border Police Going Downhill"]

[Text] Nuernberg, 21 April--Resistance against the deterioration of the Federal Border Police (BGS) is increasing: The gap is widening between the leading segment of the operational units and the Bonn administration. Critics of the deplorable conditions in the Federal Police apparently strengthened their position. In the meantime it must have become so strong that it is no longer possible to isolate the complainers. Apparently FRG Minister of the Interior Baum (FDP) is being confronted with a dramatic development in BGS commandos which is affecting the relationship of trust: A paper dated 7 December 1981, consisting of 15 typewritten pages and containing the results of a work group which was put together during a session of unit commanders and BGS Inspector Amft in Heimerzheim in the middle of November 1981. This paper states that with respect to the reestablishment of readiness and effectiveness of the BGS, it can only be said that "political neglect" is responsible for the fact that although the need for rehabilitation has been recognized, the "necessary steps are not being taken."

CSU Bundestag Deputy Regensburger (Coburg), political spokesman for civil servants in the CDU/CSU Bundestag parliamentary group, said in an interview with this paper that information was available, according to which the GDR had demanded during the negotiations on the basic agreement that changes be made in the present set-up of the Federal Border Police and that it be dissolved as a unit. Current developments within the troop could be interpreted as a confirmation of this information. The CDU/CSU Bundestag parliamentary group is preparing a parliamentary inquiry dealing with the Heimerzheimer paper. From a reliable source comes information that the American garrison in Bamberg is considering the transfer of some of its forces to the Coburg territory to close the gap that had come into existence because of the weakness of the Federal Border Police at the demarcation line.

Weakness of Internal Conditions

The above-mentioned work group faulted the fact that "comprehensive training had "practically ceased." The work group also indicated that the "mere formation" of units in case of need was only a stopgap. When protection was needed for the construction work of the West runway at the Frankfurt airport, for

instance, three companies were assembled from groups of units in Lueneburg, Gifhorn, Goslar, Hersfeld, Fulda, Rosenheim and Coburg. According to the work group, this incident revealed all of a sudden the reality of the "character of the BGS as a unit, something which has been postulated and confirmed everywhere."

Furthermore, the paper indicated that the units did not even have enough available personnel to be placed in those companies that are required for daily, regularly assigned duties on location--"including border control." In answer to an inquiry by the CDU/CSU opposition, however, the FRG minister of the interior said at the beginning of September 1981, that the "main emphasis to the daily tasks of the BGS" is "still, even today on border control." This task is being fulfilled--in accordance with the organizational structure--by companies and groups. The work group in Heimerzheim felt that if an occasion such as the one in Frankfurt is already exhausting the limits of available personnel of all the police units in the FRG, the question remains, what is to be done if such cases were to increase in frequency and location, a supposition which is not only of "hypothetical character." "With respect to the total system of internal security we could reach the breaking point faster than many of those in responsible positions are willing to admit."

In connection with assignments of BGS officials to stations such as the German Lufthansa and diplomatic representatives of the FRG, certain weaknesses are becoming apparent about the internal condition of the BGS, leading to the conclusion that poor selections of personnel are being made. The paper states that "complete groups abroad" had to be replaced, in part "because of criminal acts." An official who had received a disciplinary sentence for the second time for failure to report for duty, made a statement which seems to be symptomatic. He declared that he was no longer used to getting up early and reporting for duty on time since he had been stationed with Lufthansa, and consequently he could no longer adjust. The work group commented: Following these assignments, most of the younger officials are "unfit to serve in the troop."

Concerning the question of training and educational goals, the work group felt that professional ethics should "not only" be left "to clergymen." The company leaders should again "discuss current political events and be able to represent the concerns of the units." Service supervisors should have "a little more influence" in addition to vocational instructors, representatives of occupational groups and labor unions. The few company leaders who are still trying to mobilize their units in a spirit of solidarity are facing "serious difficulties." The "spirit of the troop," assuming that it still exists at all, is being sinned against. The objectives should be made "perfectly clear." One is dealing with a "conglomeration of administrative units," where nobody seems to know anybody and where everyone is "simply performing his duties side by side with his colleagues," something which is being noticed again and again among police units when they participate in joint assignments. "We felt that cameraderie was something different, but it also requires different prerequisites."

'Quasi Authoritative Control and Intervention Powers'

During the session of unit commanders the work group emphasized: "If the BGS loses its troop character...we are certainly moving in that direction, although

it says differently on paper...it has lost its value for use and more or less its right to exist." It has been "assimilated to death." (The reference, among other things, is to the training concept in accordance with the personnel structure law, the process of approximating the BGS to the police forces of the Laender.) The police union with its "hysterical demilitarization efforts" has the "dubious distinction" of having contributed to this condition.

Company commanders feel that the effectiveness of their troops is being paralyzed because of interference--apparently tolerated by the minister of the interior--and a mixture of activities by personnel councils and the labor union. "Personnel meetings have become tribunals, where...non-unit BGS labor-union functionaries are attacking in a loud and demagogic manner...company and commando leaders....Nobody is restraining them." Hardly any swearing-in ceremony or transfer of command takes place, where the "form and procedure" does not have to be "changed several times," because the personnel council chairman, frequently a personnel union...labor union functionary, protests against--correct and admissible--instructions by the...supervisor and immediately appeals to a 'higher authority.'" Personnel counselors and labor union functionaries have assumed "quasi authoritative control and intervention powers." A joint exercise that was planned for one company and an American unit, for instance, had to be canceled because the union lodged a protest at the FRG Ministry of the Interior.

8991
CSO: 3103/424

GENERAL

NETHERLANDS

INTELLIGENCE SERVICE HARMED BY INTERNAL DISSENTION

Amsterdam DE TELEGRAAF in Dutch 3 April 82 p 7

[Article by Johan Olde Kalter: "Dissension Threatens Our Espionage Service"]

[Text] The Hague, Saturday--The Netherlands' most secret espionage service is in trouble because of bad functioning. Immediately after the Easter recess, Prime Minister Van Agt will have to decide what has to happen with the Foreign Intelligence Service (IDB), for which he is responsible.

To this end, Minister Van Agt will hold discussions with the delegation chairmen of the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal], VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy], PvdA [Labor Party] and D'66 [Democrats of 1966], who make up the Standing Chamber Commission for the Intelligence and Security Services, in the third week of April.

Tensions

Highly placed sources in the intelligence world in the Hague expect that the Foreign Intelligence Service will not be able to be maintained in its present makeup.

Within the IDB, tensions between the military and the civilian officials have risen to an extreme. The number of sick calls among the civilian personnel is high in all levels. A number of civilian workers have also resigned.

In practice, the IDB, which falls under the Ministry of General Affairs, operates as an extension of the three military intelligence services.

The IDB functions for these intelligence services or respectively the land, air and sea forces as an espionage organ for gathering military information, particularly in the East Bloc countries.

For this, the service has a small operational detachment of about 15 spies, but it really gathers most of its information through NATO contacts.

Not At Home

A veil of secrecy surrounds the service's location, on the property Maarheeze in Wassenaar. Anyone who rings the doorbell is met by a servant in a white apron, who says: "The lady and gentleman of the house are not at home."

The Foreign Intelligence Service has a military director. The current head is former Marine Major General A.J. Romijn.

According to the intelligence world in the Hague, it can scarcely be avoided that the IDB is cut in two, so that the military intelligence side would have to begin to operate in direct cooperation with the Defense Intelligence Services under the responsibility of Minister Hans Van Mierlo of Defense.

The civilian section would have to devote itself--under the umbrella of the Ministry of General Affairs (Prime Minister Van Agt) or Foreign Affairs (Minister Van Der Stoel)--to the gathering of political and economic information abroad. There is a particular need for this kind of information in numerous ministries.

The military leadership of the Foreign Intelligence Service is scarcely interested in the gathering of this kind of information. The complaint is also heard in official circles in the Hague that information gathered by the IDB is turned over raw, without its significance being evaluated in a broader context.

There have also been difficulties with the IDB many times in the past. One low point was the arrest of its agents Rijdon and De Jager in the Soviet Union for espionage.

In the early 1970's, the service disappeared into the Defense Ministry for a short while, only to return to the Ministry of General Affairs. A few years ago, Director C.J. Hagen was retired between one day and the next and replaced by Major General Romijn.

Officially, the Ministry of General Affairs wants to make no comment on the conflicts within the espionage service in Wassenaar. A source close to Prime Minister Van Agt calls the conflict "frightfully exaggerated" and explains that the existing tensions are the result of the secrecy and stress of the trade of espionage itself.

6940

CSO: 3105/163

END

**END OF
FICHE**

DATE FILMED

May 28, 1982